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Abstract
Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has
reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as spe-
cial counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the
administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution
rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confed-
eration in favor of a ”unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is
centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards
historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and
special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional land-
scape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by
Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New Deal represented a ”constitutional
moment” that ratified major changes in the distribution of power within the federal
government. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical record has
yet to appear. This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive
chronicle that places the battles between the President and Congress over control
of the administration of federal law in historical perspective. It reviews the period
between 1889 and 1945, beginning with the Administration of Benjamin Harri-
son, ending with the Administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and paying
particular attention to FDR’s failed attempt to reorganized the executive branch.
The record reveals that these Presidents during this period consistently defended
the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the issue from
being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent illus-
trations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive.
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Christopher S. Yoo* 
Steven G. Calabresi** 
Laurence Nee*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s bore witness to a dramatic upsurge in interest in the proper roles of the 
President and Congress in controlling the execution of the law.  Much of the initial scholarship 
focused on the constitutionality of the so-called independent agencies, such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, which theoretically 
operate outside of direct presidential control.1  Interest was fanned still further by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in INS v. Chadha2 striking down the legislative veto, as well as its decision in 
Bowsher v. Synar3 invalidating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act’s attempt to lodge executive 
authority in an agent of Congress.  The proper scope of presidential power also arose in Clinton 
v. City of New York,4 which invalidated Congress’s attempt to give the president the power to 
make line item vetoes. 
But the importance of this issue has been underscored most spectacularly by the 
controversy surrounding the use of independent counsels, who are permitted to enforce federal 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University.  We would like to thank Gary Lawson, John 
McGinnis, and Saikrishna Prakash for comments on earlier drafts of this Article 
*** Chambers of the Honorable Oliver W. Wagner, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California 
1 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 31-
36; Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and 
Presidential Power:  A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608-23 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The 
Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); 
Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779; Symposium, The 
Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215; Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the 
Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1987). 
2 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
3 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
4 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
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law outside of presidential control.5  The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson6 despite a powerful dissent by Justice Scalia 
warning of the dangers of politically motivated investigations.7  The years that followed appeared 
to bear out Justice Scalia’s dire predictions, as accusations mounted that the independent counsel 
process had been subverted for political purposes,8 climaxing in the barrage of recriminations 
prompted by the role of the independent counsel in the impeachment of President Clinton.  
Further controversy was forestalled when the statute authorizing independent counsels was 
allowed to lapse in 1999. 
The scholarly commentary largely centers on whether the Constitution created a “unitary 
executive,” in which all executive authority is centralized in the president.  Participants in the 
debate have examined the text9 and ratification history10 of the Constitution to determine whether 
the Constitution rejected of the plural executive employed by the Articles of the Confederation 
                                                 
5 For early commentary on the constitutionality of independent counsels, see TERRY EASTLAND, 
ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (1989); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson:  A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was 
Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Shane, supra note 1, at 598-608; Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of 
Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Legislative Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983). 
6 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
7 Id. at 712-14, 727-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
8 See Benjamin Ginsberg & Martin Shefter, Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL. 497 
(1995).  For an analysis of the impact of the political abuse of independent counsels for the separation of powers, see 
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Steven G. 
Calabresi, Some Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & 
POL. 521 (1995). 
9 Compare, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
1377 (1994) (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause, bolstered by other constitutional provisions, represents a 
substantive grant of constitutional power); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (same); and Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural 
Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (same); with Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-55, 119 (1994) (disagreeing with 
Professor Calabresi’s views); and A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1346 (1994) (same). 
10 Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 603-05 (arguing that the preratification 
history supports the unitary executive); and Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 701, 753-89, 808-12 (same); with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 
1725, 1755-1810 (1996) (drawing the opposite conclusion); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of 
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138-53 (1994) (same). 
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and many state constitutions in favor of a structure in which all administrative authority was 
concentrated in a single person.11  To the extent that commentators have focused on the post-
ratification practices with respect to this issue, they have tended to focus primarily on the 
practices during the presidential administrations immediately following the Founding.12   
Increasingly, commentators have looked beyond the Founding era and have begun to 
assess the implications of the broader sweep of history.  Some scholars, including most notably 
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, have argued that the increase in discretionary, policymaking 
authority wielded by administrative agencies has strengthened the case in favor of the unitary 
executive.13  Others have drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing that the increased policymaking 
functions of the modern administrative state justify allowing Congress more latitude in insulating 
agencies from presidential control.14  Still others suggest that, regardless of the underlying merits, 
arguments in favor of the unitary executive have been foreclosed by the sweep of more than two 
centuries of constitutional history.15  In making these arguments, some of these scholars have 
acknowledged the incompleteness of the current historical literature and have recognized the 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note that the conclusion that the Constitution of 1787 established a unitary 
executive has found general acceptance among courts, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 110-33 (1926); 
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,l 405 (D.C. Cir.); among historians, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 250-53, 257-58 (1996); and even among leading critics 
of the unitary executive, see Strauss, supra note 1, at 599-601; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New 
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432-33 (1987). 
12 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 9, at 635-63; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of 
Powers;  Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Gerhard Casper, Executive-
Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1995); Kent 
Greenfield, Original Penumbras:  Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 
82-111 (1993); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 5-84; Prakash, supra note 10, at 789-800.  
13 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 93-106. 
14 See Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1816-21; Greene, supra note 10, at 153-95; Strauss, supra note 1. 
15 See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY :  AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 180 n.35 
(1994).(“more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution . . . render a strict separation [or powers] 
impossible”); Flaherty, supra note 10, at 1816 (suggesting that a common law constitutionalist would regard the past 
200 years of practice under the Constitution “dispositive” in foreclosing the unitary vision of the executive); Tiefer, 
supra note 5, at 103 (“From the creation of the government’s structure by the First Congress, through the 
development of the modern agency, and down to the present, the status of agencies has not been a unitary or 
monolithic one.”); see also Miller, supra note 1, at 83-86 (finding past presidents’ failure to consistently oppose 
independent agencies problematic, but ultimately insufficient to constitute acquiescence). 
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need for a more complete assessment of the historical record of presidential control over the 
execution of the law.16   
We have attempted to fill this void by embarking on a four-article series examining the 
history of the president’s ability to execute the law.  In The Unitary Executive During the First 
Half-Century,17 we analyzed the first seven presidencies under the Constitution to determine the 
view of presidential power held by the incumbents between 1789 and 1837.  In so doing, we paid 
particular attention to what is generally recognized to be the first great clash between the 
President and Congress over control of the administration of the law:  Andrew Jackson’s removal 
of his Treasury Secretary during his battle with the Bank of the United States.18  We continued 
our project in The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century,19 beginning with Martin 
Van Buren’s presidency in 1837 up through the end of Grover Cleveland’s first term in 1889.  In 
the process, we offered an extended discussion of the second great conflict over the unitary 
executive:  the impeachment of Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act.20 
Our analysis employs the interpretive method known as “departmentalism” or 
“coordinate construction,” which holds that all three branches of the federal government have the 
power and duty to interpret the Constitution and that the meaning of the Constitution is 
determined through the dynamic interaction of all three branches.21  This approach asks whether 
a long-standing and unbroken practice exists in which both Congress and the presidents have 
                                                 
16 See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 84 n.334 (noting that “a full account of the growth of 
presidential power” would allow consideration of “the enormously significant and self-conscious changes in the role 
of the presidency from the period following Jackson through Franklin Roosevelt”). 
17 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997). 
18 Id. at 1538-59. 
19 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-
Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 668 (2003). 
20 Id. at 746-58. 
21 See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1463-72. 
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acquiesced.  If so, that practice may be justifiably regarded as part of the structure of our 
government.22  In this respect, our methodology is the same as the one followed by the Supreme 
Court in INS v. Chadha,23 which relied on the fact that eleven of thirteen presidents from 
Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan had refused to accede to the legislative veto in rejecting 
arguments that the legislative veto had become an established practice in which all three 
branches had acquiesced.24 
Toward this end, we seek to examine and disprove the claim implicit in many attacks on 
the unitary executive that a custom, tradition, and practice has grown up over the last 215 years 
which “amounts to a presidential acquiescence in the existence of a congressional power to (at 
times) limit the President’s removal power and curtail his other constitutionally guaranteed 
mechanisms of control over the Executive Branch.”25  Our historical account focuses primarily 
on the three devices generally viewed as necessary to any theory of the unitary executive:  the 
president’s power to remove subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to 
direct the manner in which subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the 
president’s power to veto or nullify such officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power.26  
Where appropriate, we also discuss presidential exercises of the foreign affairs power, which 
derives largely from the Article II Vesting Clause, the same constitutional foundation as the 
president’s power to execute the law.27  We do not claim that there is consensus among all three 
                                                 
22 For the classic statement of this position, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 
(1915).  For other examples, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686 (1981); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pocket 
Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679-83 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170-76 (1926); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
23 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
24 Id. at 942 n.13. 
25 Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1457. 
26 Id. at 1458. 
27  See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art11
 6
branches of government as to the president’s control of the removal power and of the powers to 
direct and nullify.  Rather, we claim only that “there is no consistent three branch anti-unitarian 
custom, tradition, or practice that presidents have acquiesced in that trumps the constitutional 
text and the original design.”28   
Our first two articles demonstrated that the twenty-two American presidents from George 
Washington through Grover Cleveland strongly believed in the president’s sole authority to 
control execution of the law and did not hesitate to wield the mechanisms essential to any theory 
of the unitary executive.  In particular, we proved that from 1789 to 1889, each president 
asserted a broad presidential power to remove subordinate officials exercising executive policy-
making power for any reason, including policy disagreements.  We also showed that many of 
these twenty-two presidents also asserted other presidential powers of control over law execution 
including the issuing of binding orders to subordinates to take particular actions and the 
nullifying of particular actions taken by subordinates.   
We now pick up the historical account where we left off in the two prior articles and 
examine the views of the presidencies during the third half-century of our constitutional history, 
beginning with Benjamin Harrison and ending with Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  In the process, 
we offer an extended analysis of FDR’s failed attempt in 1937 and 1938 to implement the 
Brownlow Committee’s proposal to reorganize the executive branch, an event that is typically 
acknowledged as the next key battle between the President and Congress over control of the 
execution of the law.29   
                                                                                                                                                             
YALE L.J. 231, 252-65 (2001); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1676-68 
(2002). 
28 Id. 
29 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2274-75 (2001); Lessig 
& Sunstein, supra note 9, at 84 n.334; Miller, supra note 1, at 79, 85. 
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The period covered by this Article represents the crux of the debate over whether our 
history under the Constitution has given rise to an established practice vitiating the unitary 
executive.  It is during this period that two institutions generally assumed to be inconsistent with 
the unitary executive—the emergence of independent agencies30 and the extension civil service 
protections to federal employees31—were thought to become more widespread.  This period also 
bore witness to the appointment of special prosecutors on three occasions, as well as the rapid 
expansion of the federal bureaucracy spurred by the New Deal.  Many constitutional theorists, 
led by Bruce Ackerman, regard these changes to be so sweeping as to constitute a “constitutional 
moment” that implicitly ratified major changes in the allocation of power within the federal 
government.32 
Although many scholars assert that these developments effectively foreclose any 
arguments in favor of the unitary executive as a matter of history, the closer examination of the 
historical record laid out in this Article reveals that such assertions are too blithe.  Instead, what 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 578 (“Almost fifty years of experience has accustomed lawyers 
and judges to accepting the independent regulatory commissions, in the metaphor, as a ‘headless “fourth branch”’ of 
government.”); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice:  The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1236 (2000) (arguing that independent agencies have a 
sufficient historical pedigree to justify regarding them as an established constitutional practice).  It is a common 
misconception that the history of independent agencies began with the creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in 1887.  This conclusion is wrong in two respects:  First, there was precedent for entities, such 
as the Second Bank of the United States, that enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the federal government.  As we 
have noted earlier, however, the president’s ability to remove federal funds from the Bank provided him with a 
mechanism with which to retain control of the execution of federal law.  Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1539 
n.309.  Second, the original ICC was placed in the Department of the Interior and does not appear to have been 
regarded as independent by either the president or Congress.  See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 19, at 797-99.  As 
this Article demonstrates, the ICC did not become even arguably independent until well after 1887.   
31 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 582 (“The civil service . . . may appropriately be regarded as the 
fourth effective branch government . . ..”).  It is another common misconception that limits on the power to remove 
federal employees began with the Civil Service Act of 1883.  As we have pointed out, the original Act did not 
provide federal employees with any protection against removal aside from prohibiting the firing employees for 
refusing to make political contributions.  See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 19, at 788-89.  As we shall see, the civil 
service system did not place limits on the president’s removal power until well after the end of the period covered by 
this Article. 
32 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991); Bruce Ackerman 
& David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801, 845-96 (1995); Flaherty, supra note 10, at 
1819-21. 
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emerges is a largely consistent pattern of presidential insistence on the unitariness of the 
executive branch and a general willingness by presidents to defend their sole authority to control 
the execution of the law. 
This period also bore witness to a fundamental shift in the balance of power between 
Congress and the President.  At the commencement of the era addressed by this Article, 
Congress had clearly emerged as the victor in its battle with the presidency over 
Reconstruction.33  It would not be until the early part of the twentieth century that the presidency 
(particularly in the figures of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt) 
would reemerge from the shadow of congressional dominance in the aftermath of the Civil War.   
Furthermore, a number of external forces began to transform the basic relationship 
between Congress and the president.  Domestically, the rise of large industrial corporations 
sparked, for the first time, calls for strong central regulation, which in turn provided the impetus 
for a concomitant expansion of the federal bureaucracy.  America’s emergence as an 
international power also strengthened the case for stronger centralized control.  As a result, 
Americans in general began to look to the president not simply as an administrator, but rather as 
the locus of political leadership and the predominant voice in shaping public policy. 
As a result of these changes, the character of America changed as well.  The country 
became more national and international in its focus and more homogenous in its character.  As 
the country changed, so too did the presidency.  As America became more imperial, her 
presidents took on an imperial persona as well.  One might say that much of the potential for 
presidential power that existed implicitly in the first two periods comes to be actualized in the 
                                                 
33  See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-1901, at 45-48 (1958); Keith E. 
Whittington, Bill Clinton Was No Andrew Johnson, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 422, 447-49 (2000). 
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dominant figures of this third period.  These figures thereby set the tone for the executive that 
will be seen in the fourth and final period. 
Thus, with the onset of the twentieth century, the presidency underwent a dramatic 
transformation.  The nation’s increasing industrialization and the emergence of the U.S. as a 
world power made a strong Chief Executive more important than ever.  With the increasing 
influence of the mass media, the president also began to emerge as a leader of public opinion.  
The presidency expanded to fill these new roles and, in the process, continued to defend its 
power to control the execution of the laws. 
We begin in Parts I through X below with a discussion of the ten presidencies between 
1889 and 1945.  We conclude in Part XI below with a discussion of the Brownlow Commission 
and of President Franklin Roosevelt’s unsuccessful effort to abolish the independent agencies 
and merge them into the executive branch. 
I. BENJAMIN HARRISON 
When Benjamin Harrison became the first and only grandson of a president to be elected 
to the presidency, many Americans were uncertain how much to expect from him.  Harrison had 
been selected by the Electoral College after losing the popular vote to Grover Cleveland.  
Moreover, Harrison had had only a short career in national politics before assuming the 
presidency.   
Any doubts about Harrison’s willingness to take responsibility for executing the law 
would prove short lived.  As Harrison’s biographers, Homer Socolofsky and Allan Spetter 
report: 
Benjamin Harrison lacked experience as an administrator and had had only six 
years in Washington as a United States senator by the time he became president.  
Thus, political observers concluded that he would defer on many issues to 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art11
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members of his cabinet who had long been in the public eye.  Halfway through his 
presidency the skepticism about Harrison’s ability to lead his own administration 
had changed.  By then it was recognized that he was absolutely the head in his 
administration.  Harrison was sure of his position.  While he did not interfere in 
the departmental work of members of his cabinet, neither would he permit any 
encroachment on his overall presidential power.34 
Thus, Harrison took charge of his administration and directed the actions of his subordinates.  He 
recognized that as president he possessed the executive power, and accordingly he told his 
subordinates what to do.  Socolofsky and Spetter report that “Harrison would be sensitive about 
his executive and administrative authority as president and would not tolerate any challenges to 
his power.”35 
Harrison offered the most definitive statement of his attitude regarding the president’s 
sole authority to execute the law in the memoirs that were published after he left office.  Harrison 
specifically noted that the president “is responsible for all executive action.”36  Although 
“[r]outine matters proceed without the knowledge or interference of the president; . . . if any 
matter of major importance arises the Secretary presents it for the consideration and advice of the 
President.”37  The chief executive may make some effort to accommodate the views of one of his 
cabinet members.  However, “when the President has views that he feels cannot yield, those 
views must prevail, for the responsibility is his, both in a Constitutional and popular sense.”38  
Allowing cabinet members to exercise authority inconsistent with the views of the president 
“would be a framing out of his Constitutional powers” to “eight Presidents” that would be 
                                                 
34 HOMER E. SOCOLOFSKY & ALLAN B. SPETTER, THE PRESIDENCY OF BENJAMIN HARRISON 84 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
35 Id. at 47-48. 
36  BENJAMIN HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS 105 (1897). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 106. 
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inconsistent with the Framers’ rejection of an executive counsel in favor of an executive branch 
headed by a single figure.39 
During Harrison’s presidency, there were generally two cabinet meetings a week as well 
as individual weekly cabinet meetings with each individual member of the cabinet.40  “Before 
signing a bill passed by Congress, Harrison always consulted the cabinet member who was most 
likely to be involved.”41  Harrison vigorously exercised his appointment power as a way of 
supervising the executive branch.  Harrison “ignored the bosses,” against whom he waged a 
continuing battle “over the spoils of victory—patronage.”42  Harrison personally oversaw many 
civil service matters in a somewhat impractical attempt to keep personal control over 
appointments43 and appointed a young Theodore Roosevelt to the Civil Service Commission.44  
He changed some seventy-five percent of the post officers and twenty-seven percent of the 
postmasters, numbers comparable to those of his predecessor, Cleveland.45   
Harrison also took a number of other key actions in domestic policy that demonstrated his 
vigor as an executor of federal law.  Under Harrison, a number of new federal statutes were 
passed that delegated substantial new powers to the executive branch.  These statutes included 
the Sherman Antitrust Act;46 the McKinley Tariff Bill, which delegated significant powers to the 
president to grant exemptions;47 and the Land Revision Act of 1891, which delegated to the 
                                                 
39  Id. at 70.  See Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:  The Not-
So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 977-78 (2001). 
40 SOCOLOFSKY & SPETTER, supra note 34, at 85. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 29. 
43 Id. at 43. 
44 Id. at 40. 
45 Id. at 39. 
46 Id. at 53. 
47 Id. at 51. 
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president the power to set aside public lands as national forests.48  Thus, the amount of delegated 
power that the president could control the execution of increased dramatically during the 
Harrison years.   
Another matter involving the unitary executive that arose during the Harrison 
Administration was the extraordinary series of events surrounding the attempted assassination of 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field by David S. Terry.49  Terry and his wife were litigants in a 
case heard by Field and two other federal judges while the justice was riding circuit in 
California.  The justice ruled against Terry’s wife, after which Terry attempted to assault Field in 
open court.  In the wake of that attempt and after Terry and his wife had been overheard making 
threats to kill Field, Attorney General William Henry Harrison Miller assigned U.S. Marshal 
David Neagle to accompany Field on his travels in California and to protect the justice from the 
Terrys.  While riding a train in California, David Terry encountered Field on the train and 
attacked him.  Neagle came to Justice Field’s defense and shot Terry dead when he refused to 
cease and desist. 
California officials took Neagle into custody for Terry’s murder, and Neagle sought 
habeas corpus relief under a federal statute that allowed release if Neagle had killed Terry “in 
pursuance of a law of the United States.”50  No statute had been enacted under which Neagle was 
safeguarding Justice Field, but Neagle was assigned to protect Field on the orders of the Attorney 
General, who had assumed there was implied executive power to protect the officers and 
instrumentalities of the United States even in the absence of a statutory mandate.  Cunningham v. 
Neagle thus presented the question whether the constitutional grant of the executive power to the 
                                                 
48 Id. at 71. 
49 See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 5-6, 42-54 (1890) (reviewing the facts of the case). 
50 Id. at 41. 
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president authorized the president to take action despite the absence of any statutory mandate, 
the same issue that would arise in the Steel Seizure Case51 a half-century later.  Related to this 
was the question of whether Neagle had killed Terry “in pursuance of a law of the United States” 
because the president was validly acting under his implied presidential powers. 
The Harrison Administration was in charge of arguing this case before the Supreme 
Court.  Attorney General Miller argued the case himself, maintaining: 
 It was the duty of the Executive Department of the United States to guard 
and protect, at any hazard, the life of Mr. Justice Field in the discharge of his 
duty: 1. Because such protection is essential to the existence of the government; 2. 
Because it is enjoined upon the President, as the executive, he being require to 
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed;” 3. The marshal was merely the 
hand of the executive, and unless protected by the marshal the courts and judges 
have no protection. 
 The reason why I say it is the duty of the Executive Department to protect 
the judicial, and why I say it has the authority so to do, is because the power of 
self-preservation is essential to the very existence of the government.52 
Miller mentioned Abraham Lincoln’s extraordinary actions without statutory authority as 
support for the Harrison Administration’s extra-statutory protection of the life of Justice Field.  
He also pointed out that the presidential oath of office requires the president to defend the 
government, its officers, and its instrumentalities.  He observed that after Washington was 
inaugurated but before Congress had met to pass any laws, the president surely had the authority 
to defend the U.S. government.  Continuing in that vein, the Attorney General told the Court that 
the President, in like manner, by the very fact that he is made the chief executive 
of the nation, and is charged to protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution, and 
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, is invested with necessary and 
implied executive powers which neither of the other branches of government can 
either take away or abridge; that many of these powers, pertaining to each branch 
                                                 
51 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
52 135 U.S. at 13. 
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of government, are self-executing, and in no way dependent, except as to ways 
and means, upon legislation.53 
Miller specifically argued that the Vesting Clause of Article II grants the president the 
executive power of the nation and that the Constitution further enjoins upon him the duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.  Together those two clauses give the president implied 
powers.54  If the president could not protect courts with the U.S. marshals, they would not be able 
to protect even themselves against assassination attempts.  Finally, he concluded Neagle’s 
federal acts in protection of Justice Field trumped state law under the principles of Cohens v. 
Virginia,55 Ableman v. Booth,56 and McCulloch v. Maryland.57 
These arguments to the Court by Harrison’s Attorney General constitute a complete 
acceptance by the Harrison Administration of a number of key tenets of the theory of the unitary 
executive.  Miller endorses the Lincolnian view that the Vesting Clause of Article II, taken 
together with the Take Care Clause, vests the president with the whole executive power of the 
nation and gives the president broad, implied powers to execute both the Constitution and laws.  
These implied, nonstatutory powers are broad enough to support Neagle’s taking of Terry’s life.  
While the Attorney General makes no mention of the implied presidential power of removal and 
direction per se, that power is narrower in scope than the protective power he finds implicit in 
Article II.  It is inconceivable that an Administration that endorsed Miller’s Lincolnian 
interpretation of Article II would not also believe that the president had the authority to control 
subordinate executive officials in their execution of federal law.  Indeed, the Attorney General 
exercised precisely those powers of direction and control when he specifically told subordinates 
                                                 
53 Id. at 16. 
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55 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
56 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
57 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
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in California to take steps to protect Justice Field by giving him a body guard.  If Harrison had 
the inherent authority to order David Terry to be killed then surely he had the lesser inherent 
power to remove and direct subordinates. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. Neagle enthusiastically endorsed the 
Harrison Administration’s position, over the spirited dissent of Justice Lamar joined by Chief 
Justice Fuller.  The Court said it did not matter that there was no statute being executed here by 
the president, reasoning that “any obligation fairly and properly inferable from [the Constitution] 
. . . is a ‘law’ within the meaning of this phrase.”58  The Court added that it would be absurd if 
the Constitution did not allow presidents to protect judges in the ordinary exercise of their 
duties,59 and the Court pointed out that it was dependent on the marshals to execute federal 
judgments.60  The Court added: 
If we turn to the executive department of the government, we find . . . [that] the 
Constitution, section 3, Article II, declares that the President “shall take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed.” . . . He is declared to be commander-in-chief of 
the army and navy of the United States.  The duties which are thus imposed upon 
him he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the constitution, and the 
creation by acts of congress, of executive departments . . ..61 
The Court concluded by saying that federal law authorized Neagle to do whatever California law 
would have authorized a marshal to do in keeping the peace.62  The Court therefore affirmed the 
lower court in granting habeas relief to Neagle. 
The scope and nature of the majority’s ruling is underscored by the arguments made in 
Justice Lamar’s dissent.  It may be noteworthy here that Justice Lamar was a southerner who 
may not have liked the Lincolnian arguments of the majority with respect to executive and 
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60 Id. at 61 (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394 (1879)).  
61 Id. at 63. 
62 Id. at 68-69. 
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federal power.  Justice Lamar argued that the habeas statute would only protect Neagle if he had 
acted pursuant to a federal statute and not if he was acting under some claim of implied 
presidential power.63  Lamar denied that the executive could act without a statute, arguing that 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress alone has the power to legislate to protect 
judges.64  Lamar’s dissenting view was that Congress was the depository of all the federal 
government’s implied law-making powers.  The majority ruled ringingly in favor of implied 
presidential power, which is surely helpful to those of us who believe in an implied presidential 
power to remove, direct, or nullify. 
Another case arose in the Supreme Court during the Harrison years that has tangential 
relevance to our thesis.  In McAllister v. United States,65  the Court ruled six to three that the 
president had the statutory authority to remove a judge appointed for the territory of Alaska 
before the territorial judge’s four-year statutory term of office expired.  Since it was clear that the 
1869 amendment to the Tenure of Office Act, which was still in force at the time the dispute 
arose, acknowledged the president’s right to suspend and replace any civil officer so long as the 
new office holder’s nomination was submitted to the Senate within thirty days of the 
commencement of its next session.66  Because the statute on its face recognized the president’s 
right to remove McAllister,67 the case did not present an occasion for the Court to address the 
constitutionality of congressional attempts to restrict the removal power.  The fact that the 
Tenure of Office Act had subsequently been repealed suggested that a case directly presenting 
                                                 
63 Id. at 78-79 (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 82-84. 
65 141 U.S. 174 (1891). 
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the president’s power to remove might arise in the future.  The Court discreetly declined to 
discuss the issue in advance.68 
One major question hanging over the Harrison Administration was the president’s role in 
foreign policy given the presence of James G. Blaine as Secretary of State.  Blaine was a 
towering figure in national politics who had been the GOP candidate for president in 1884, as 
well as a leader of the GOP going back to the 1880 national convention.  Fortunately for 
Harrison, Blaine was constantly ill between 1889 and 1893.  In 1891, when Blaine was 
completely incapacitated, Harrison seized the opportunity to put his imprint on the nation’s 
foreign policy.69  In fact, Socolofsky and Spetter claim: 
Since the 1960’s, various studies have asserted Harrison’s importance in late-
nineteenth-century foreign policy—placing Blaine in proper perspective—and 
have acknowledged these accomplishments among others:  his major contribution 
to the development of the new navy, the establishment of the first American 
protectorate in Samoa, participation in the first Pan-American Conference, and a 
most successful commercial reciprocity policy.70   
In addition, Socolofsky and Spetter give Harrison personal credit for “the attempt to obtain a first 
naval base in the Caribbean, the encouragement of the construction of a Central American canal, 
and, of course, the effort to annex Hawaii—not so much a failure as a final step toward the 
events of 1898.”71  After Harrison dictated the nation’s policy in unresolved disputes with Chile, 
Great Britain, and Italy,72 Blaine was reduced to a minimal role in the face of which he finally 
resigned.73 
                                                 
68 Id. at 178 (“What may be the powers of the president over territorial judges, now that section 1768 
is repealed, is a question we need not now discuss.”). 
69 SOCOLOFSKY & SPETTER, supra note 34, at 125. 
70 Id. at 206-07. 
71 Id. at 207. 
72 Id. at 129-30, 136-52.   
73 Id. at 130. 
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In sum, Harrison was an active, involved president who was in every sense the head of 
his Administration.  He directly supervised the affairs of his administration and made large 
numbers of removals.  And, in Cunningham v. Neagle, his Administration argued for and 
obtained a Supreme Court ruling that was the Court’s broadest statement of implied executive 
power up to that time.  In McAllister v. United States, the Harrison Administration sought a got a 
broad ruling on the president’s statutory authority to remove territorial judges.  The Harrison 
Administration was thus a good one for proponents of the theory of the unitary executive. 
II. GROVER CLEVELAND’S SECOND TERM:  1893-1897 
The presidential election of 1892 represented the first contest between candidates who 
had both seen presidential service at the time of the election.74  Grover Cleveland was “well 
aware that only one other Democrat had ever run in three consecutive presidential elections:  his 
hero, Andrew Jackson.”75  Like Jackson, Cleveland was destined to win a popular majority three 
times in a row—a feat that was not exceeded until the administration of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.76   
Richard Welch, Cleveland’s biographer, emphasizes that Cleveland was “a later day 
Jacksonian”77 who 
wished to be seen as a president like Andrew Jackson, a man who was a tribune of 
the people.  He appreciated that the American public was wearied of the personal 
quarrels and bickering that had characterized American politics since the Civil 
War and would look with favor upon a candidate and a president who appeared to 
stand tall and independent, an example of rugged individualism and political 
courage.78 
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77 Id. at 118. 
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Cleveland had “a conception of the presidency that if not imperial, was vaguely 
monarchical.  Convinced that the president was the sole officer of the national government who 
was elected by ‘all the people,’ he felt an obligation jealously to safeguard and protect the 
prerogatives of the presidential office for his successors.”79  For this reason, Welch reports that 
“Republican cartoons often portrayed Cleveland in the toga of a Roman emperor, and there was a 
general belief that Cleveland was exerting the authority of the presidential office and intervening 
in legislative policy in an unprecedented manner.”80  Welch concludes, “There can be little 
dispute that Cleveland dominated the executive branch of the government during both of his 
administrations.”81  He adds that “Cleveland was successful in asserting the autonomy of the 
presidency, and he was unsuccessful in achieving executive-legislative collaboration.”82 
As a good Jacksonian Democrat, Grover Cleveland was a staunch defender of the 
president’s removal power and of the unitary executive.  In fact, as we described in The Unitary 
Executive During the Second Half-Century, Cleveland had obtained the actual repeal of the 
revised Tenure of Office Act during his first term and took a wide range of other measures to 
defend the president’s authority to execute the law.83  Cleveland thus took office for the second 
time in 1893 as a committed friend of the unitary executive. 
For our purposes, the most important domestic issue of Cleveland’s second term was his 
use of federal troops in Chicago in July 1894 to assure the free movement of railroad traffic and 
the end the Pullman strike.84  This strike was a major labor action caused by the extraordinary 
wage cuts enacted by the Pullman Car Company, which led to a strike of its employees and a 
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sympathy strike by members of the American Railway Union led by the socialist Eugene V. 
Debs.  Debs persuaded the railway union to boycott all Pullman cars effective June 26 such that 
the union workers would refuse to work on any train that carried a Pullman car.85  Richard Welch 
reports that by “the early days of July, rail traffic to and from Chicago was at 10% of its usual 
volume, the federal mails were seriously obstructed, and the Chicago Tribune was denouncing 
Debs as an anarchist who had dictatorial ambitions.”86 
The Cleveland Administration responded to these developments by having Attorney 
General Richard Olney get a sweeping court injunction barring any efforts to interfere with rail 
traffic in and out of Chicago.  Cleveland then dispatched federal troops to Chicago with orders to 
make sure that the injunction was obeyed.  Welch reports that by “July 10, Debs, with seventy 
other union members, had been indicted and arrested for violating the judicial injunction, and 
federal troops had secured the safe passage of rail traffic through Chicago.  Strikes and disorders 
in states west of the Mississippi were ended by means of other injunctions and the dispatch of 
other units of the United States Army.”87  It was in all a very dramatic show of executive and 
federal power by Cleveland.  He was not the first president to send federal troops to restore order 
during a strike; he was, however, the first “to do so at his own initiative and not at the application 
of a state governor.”88 
The controversy over the Pullman strikes of July 1884 became the subject of litigation 
when the Cleveland Administration went into federal court and sought an injunction against the 
strikers not for violating any statute, but for obstruction interstate commerce and the U.S. postal 
service.  The Cleveland Administration’s claim was that the Constitution gave the federal 
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government an implied power to keep interstate commerce and the mails free of any obstructions 
and that the executive could do this either on its own or with the aid of a court order.  The 
injunction issued, and Debs and others were imprisoned for six months for violating it.   
Debs sought habeas relief and pursued his claim up to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
ruled unanimously for Cleveland in a sweeping opinion by Justice Brewer.89  The Court found 
that the national government had jurisdiction over this local Illinois disturbance because the 
disturbance was clogging interstate commerce and the passage of the mails.90  Thus, even though 
Debs was not tried by a jury for violating any federal statute, he and his cohorts had nonetheless 
created a public nuisance that was interfering with valid federal powers and from which Debs 
could be enjoined by a court of equity.91  In essence, the Court found an implied federal power in 
the absence of legislation, and the Court held the executive could execute (and litigate under) 
that implied federal power in the absence of any federal statute.  In fact, the Court suggested in 
dicta that the president could have dispatched troops to clear away the strikers even in the 
absence of any court injunction.92   
In short, the Court, egged on by the Cleveland Administration, took a Lincolnian view of 
the breadth of the president’s protective executive power.  Consonant with the unitary executive 
thesis, In re Debs supports the notion that, notwithstanding the Steel Seizure Case, the president 
has broad implied power to act in the absence of statute even if doing so deprives individual 
citizens of their liberty.  If the president has that implied power, as Debs suggests he does, then it 
would be hard to imagine he does not have authority to control his subordinates in the execution 
of the laws and remove them at will. 
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Cleveland’s biographer Richard Welch nicely sums up the ironies of Cleveland’s role in 
breaking the strikes of 1894: 
 For a student of the American presidency, the most interesting feature of 
Cleveland’s actions during the Pullman strike is the witness they offer to his 
evolving conception of presidential authority.  In the campaign of 1884, 
Cleveland had run on a Democratic platform calling for renewed respect for the 
rights and sovereignty of the individual states, and for many years thereafter he 
had given periodic warning against undue centralization of power in the federal 
government.  In 1894 he claimed for the chief executive of the national 
government the authority to supersede the state of Illinois as the protector of law 
and order within its boundaries.  Brushing aside the objections of Governor 
Altgeld, Cleveland assumed the police powers traditionally reserved to state and 
local governments as he authorized the use of federal military power in a labor-
management dispute.  Like his hero Andrew Jackson, Cleveland could 
simultaneously speak against the centralization of power in the federal 
government and expand the power of the federal executive. . . . He quoted 
Jefferson when denouncing federal interference in local elections, but he acted 
like Jackson when he overrode Governor Altgeld and claimed supremacy for the 
federal government and its chief executive during the Chicago railroad strike. 
 He asserted presidential power more successfully than had any president 
since Lincoln, and “in his role as ‘the national sheriff of public law and order,’” 
he extended “the authority of the federal government despite his repeated 
warnings against the evils of undue centralization of power.”93 
The second Cleveland Administration also litigated a noteworthy case that implicated the 
presidential removal power even more directly.94  The case arose when Cleveland fired Lewis 
Parsons from his job as a district attorney for no reason other than that he was a holdover from 
the Harrison Administration.  The governing statute provided that the terms of district attorneys 
“shall be appointed for four years.”  This provision grew out of an 1820 statute that established a 
four-year term for many civil officers while explicitly providing that these officers “shall be 
removable from office at pleasure.”95  The language explicitly authorizing removal was deleted 
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by the Tenure of Office Act of 1867.  It was unclear, however, whether the subsequent repeal of 
the Tenure of Office Act reinstated the provision recognizing the president’s right to remove 
district attorneys before their four-year terms expired. 
In Parsons v. United States,96 a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Peckham, 
issued what amounts to a paean to the unitary executive.  He discussed the full history of the 
removal power from the Decision of 178997 up through the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act, 
mentioning that such leading figures as John Adams, Justice Story, Chancellor Kent, Attorney 
General Clifford, and Attorney General Crittenden had all regarded it settled as a matter of both 
interpretation and practice that the removal power was vested in the president alone.98  Justice 
Peckham’s opinion basically gives an abbreviated history of the removal power from 1789 up to 
the 1890s that is thoroughly consistent with the thesis of this series of articles.  He describes the 
Tenure of Office Act as an aberration from the well established practice of the government that 
was best explained by the extraordinarily poor relations between President Andrew Johnson and 
Congress in the wake of the Civil War.99  Justice Peckham leaves no doubt that he believes the 
repeal of the Tenure of Office Act restored the pre-1867 practice of an unlimited presidential 
power of removal, and he construes the repeal statute as authorizing Cleveland’s firing of 
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Briefly stated, the initial draft of the bill to establish the Department of Foreign Affairs provided 
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Parsons.100  The Parsons case is thus a resounding victory for a broad presidential power of 
removal.  The fact that the Cleveland fired Parsons and then litigated the case up to the Supreme 
Court establishes that the second Cleveland Administration was just as devoted to the theory of 
the unitary executive as was the first. 
A final area of domestic policy during Cleveland’s second term where he made an 
important contribution was the expansion of the number of federal employees covered by the 
civil service system.101  Cleveland expanded the classified service from sixteen thousand to 
twenty-seven thousand in 1889 and then by another forty-four thousand positions in 1895-96.  In 
sum, Cleveland expanded the civil service system in percentage terms by a larger degree than 
any other president.102   
Although the expansion of the civil service is often perceived as inconsistent with the 
unitariness of the executive branch, the opposite is actually true.  As we have noted earlier, it is a 
common misapprehension that the Civil Service Act of 1883 place substantive limits on the 
president’s removal power.  In fact, the Act left the president’s removal power largely unfettered, 
aside from preventing him for discharging a federal employee for refusing to make political 
contributions.103  Indeed, some of the most ardent supporters of civil service stridently opposed 
using civil service system to impose limits on the president’s power to remove.  As noted by 
George William Curtis, who was the former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission under 
Grant and perhaps the foremost advocate of civil service reform: 
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Having annulled all reason for the improper exercise of the power of dismissal, 
we hold that it is better to take the risk of occasional injustice from passion and 
prejudice, which no law or regulation can control, than to seal up incompetency, 
negligence, insubordination, insolence, and every other mischief in the service, by 
requiring a virtual trial at law before an unfit or incapable clerk can be removed.104 
Cleveland helped to protect the integrity of the removal power by rejecting a request from the 
Civil Service Commission, which for a time included Theodore Roosevelt as a holdover member 
from the Harrison Administration, that he issue an executive order requiring a written statement 
of reasons for each and every removal.105  Thus, aside from preventing officials from dunning 
federal employees into paying political assessments, the original Civil Service Act did not 
purport to place any limits on the removal power.  Its effect was instead to weaken the patronage 
influence of the Senate.  Leonard White quotes one Senator complaining that “‘[t]he reform of 
the civil service has doubtless shorn the office of Senator of a good deal of power.’  Conversely, 
it tended to add authority to the office of Chief Executive.”106  The expansion of the civil service 
is more properly regarded as a mechanism that presidents employed to enhance, rather than 
weaken, their control over the administration of the law.  Cleveland’s policies of expanding the 
classified service while refusing to permit any restrictions on the president’s power to remove 
thus tended to reinforce the unitariness of the executive.   
In sum, Cleveland was thus a vigorous defender of the theory of the unitary executive 
who secured repeal of the Tenure of Office Act during his first term and who won two important 
Supreme Court victories for broad inherent executive power during his second.  There was 
certainly no acceptance of any diminution in the president’s powers over removal or law 
execution during Grover Cleveland’s second term as president. 
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III. WILLIAM MCKINLEY 
William McKinley became president in 1897 after having been elected as the candidate 
of the Republican party—a party torn between its Whiggish roots and its recent Lincolnian past.  
Lewis Gould, McKinley’s biographer, reports that the “Whiggish heritage of the Republicans 
made them suspicious of a strong executive; a powerful Congress was the appropriate vehicle for 
their nationalism.”107  The heritage of Lincoln, however, pointed in the direction of greater 
executive power.   
In the end, McKinley turned out to be another strong president in the mold of Lincoln or 
Cleveland.  In the process he laid the foundations of the modern presidency, anticipating many 
innovations associated more today with Theodore Roosevelt.  Gould further observes, 
“Imperceptibly but inexorably, the power of the presidency expanded under McKinley’s deft 
direction.  He left no overt statement that he intended to restore the prestige and authority of his 
office, but his actions during his first year reveal a president with an instinct for power and a 
clear purpose of augmenting it.”108  So transformed was the office that McKinley “surrounded the 
presidency with a dignity that became almost imperial.”109 
In domestic affairs, McKinley quietly retained firm control of this administration.  He 
was a conscientious chief executive who met with his cabinet twice a week.110  One 
contemporary reports, “Sometimes he led discussions [but] quite as often he first elicited the 
views of his counselors.”111  McKinley also “left the operations of the Justice Department to [his] 
                                                 
107 LEWIS GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 2 (1980). 
108 Id. at 56. 
109 Id. at 9. 
110 Id. at 39. 
111 Id. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 27
attorney general.”112  It would be a mistake, however, to construe McKinley’s willingness to 
consider the views of his department heads as passivity.  Lewis Gould reports, “Whatever their 
experience with McKinley, the cabinet members knew who ran the administration.”113  In 
particular, McKinley successfully asserted “[t]he primacy of the President in foreign affairs.”114  
He did this not only by strengthening the president’s control of foreign policy as compared with 
the Congress, but also by asserting his control over what his Secretaries of State were able to do.  
John Sherman—who accepted the position of Secretary of State at age seventy-three as a 
capstone for his distinguished career in public service, only to prove too past his prime to be 
effective in the job—offered some telling remarks when stepping down.  Lewis Gould reports: 
When John Sherman resigned [as Secretary of State], he wrote that McKinley 
“evinced a disposition to assume all the functions of the members of his Cabinet 
and especially the duties of the State Department.”  The outgoing secretary of 
state added that McKinley’s “cabinet counsels were not a free exchange of 
opinions but rather the mandates of a paramount ruler.”115 
McKinley also asserted his authority over Sherman’s successor, John Hay, such that McKinley 
“supervised and controlled the overall outline of what Hay did.”116 
McKinley confronted a more difficult situation when controversy emerged regarding 
Secretary of War Russell Alger’s inability to manage the logistics of supporting the Spanish-
American War.117  McKinley tried in various subtle ways to induce Alger to resign, but when 
Alger made a public statement saying he would not leave, McKinley dispatched Vice-President 
Garret A. Hobart to tell Alger the president wanted him to submit his resignation.118  Alger 
promptly resigned, in one of the more public removals of the McKinley Administration.  As the 
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Alger and Sherman departures indicate, McKinley was not shy about triggering the resignations 
of top aides in whom he had lost confidence. 
William McKinley made at least one removal from office during his tenure as president 
which was to trigger an important case in the history of the removal power:  Shurtleff v. United 
States.119  Ferdinand Shurtleff was nominated, confirmed, and then appointed to be a general 
appraiser of merchandise under the Customs Administrative Act, which provided cryptically that 
he could be removed for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office.120  On May 3, 1899, 
McKinley removed Shurtleff without citing any of those grounds of removal and without any 
notice or hearing.  McKinley instead relied exclusively on the general power of removal 
possessed by all presidents going back to the Decision of 1789.  Shurtleff sued, seeking back pay 
on the grounds that the Customs Administrative Act had limited the president’s power to remove 
him.  The McKinley Administration, and later the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, 
defended the validity of the removal. 
The Court upheld the executive branch’s claim of power.  Justice Peckham was the 
author of Shurtleff, just as he had been the author of the Parsons decision under Cleveland.  
Assuming arguendo that the Constitution permitted Congress to limit the removal power,121  
Peckham concluded that it would have to do so by “very clear and explicit language.”122  
Peckham concluded that life tenure was a rare condition under the Constitution intended only for 
judges and that limiting the removal power “would involve the alternation of the universal 
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practice of the government for over a century.”123  Accordingly, Peckham construed the Act 
narrowly as only giving general appraisers a right to a hearing when they were removed for 
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance.  The Act did not protect general appraisers from the 
president’s general removal power, which could be used for any reason whatsoever.124 
It is hard to know precisely what to make of the language in Shurtleff assuming for the 
purposes of that decision that Congress might be able to restrict the president’s power to remove.  
At least three plausible interpretations come to mind.  First, this language could represent dicta 
acknowledging that limitations on the removal power might be constitutional.  Second, the Court 
could simply have intended to reserve for another day an issue that was not properly presented.  
Third, Shurtleff might be regarded as an early example of the principle that courts will not 
deviate from the traditional distribution of authority unless Congress employs unmistakably clear 
language clearly signifying that that is its intent,125 an interpretation that implicitly affirms the 
constitutional foundation of the removal power.   
Two considerations favor one of the interpretations which regard Shurtleff as being 
consistent with the unitary executive.  The first is the fact that the opinion was authored by 
Justice Peckham, who also authored the ringing endorsement of the unitary executive in Parsons.  
The second is that subsequent Supreme Court cases following Shurtleff regarded the 
constitutionality of congressionally imposed limits to the removal power to be an open 
question.126 
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McKinley’s willingness to enforce federal law is further demonstrated by his willingness 
to send federal troops to restore order during a labor dispute in the Coeur d’Alene mining district 
of Idaho in the spring of 1899.127  Despite the superficial similarity between McKinley’s actions 
and Cleveland’s use of federal troops to quell the Pullman strike, McKinley maintained good 
relations with organized labor, and there was no repetition during his term of the problems that 
had plagued the second Cleveland Administration.  McKinley’s vigorous use of the bully pulpit 
of the presidency “is still one of his least recognized contributions to the emergence of the 
modern presidency.”128   
McKinley’s willingness to assert control of the administration of the law is also evident 
in his policies with respect to the civil service.  While McKinley had long supported civil service 
reform, he faced calls from his own party to make more positions available for patronage by 
scaling back the expansion of the classified service promulgated during the waning days of the 
Cleveland Administration.  In the end, McKinley attempted to steer a middle course, pulling 
back somewhat from the position adopted by Cleveland, but stopping short of the wholesale 
reversal desired by many of his fellow Republicans.  On July 27, 1897, McKinley took the step 
that Cleveland refused to take and issued an executive order requiring that “[n]o removal shall be 
made from any position subject to competitive examination except for just cause and upon 
written charges . . . and of which the accused shall have full notice and an opportunity to make 
defense.”129  The Civil Service Commission would later clarify that requiring removals to be 
based on “cause” was not intended to impose a general limit on the power to remove.  It was 
instead intended to ensure that the executive had not acted out of political motives barred by the 
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statute.  The Commission later emphasized the importance of not misconstruing the “cause” 
requirement as imposing any substantive limits on the removal power, since doing so “would not 
only involve enormous labor, but would give a permanence of tenure in the public service quite 
inconsistent with the efficiency of that service.”130  The Supreme Court gave its approval to this 
position in Keim v. United States,131 in which the Court held that “the action of the Secretary of 
the Interior in removing the petitioner from office on account of inefficiency is beyond review in 
the courts.”132  Citing its previous decisions in Ex parte Hennen133 and Parsons v. United States,134 
the Court concluded: 
[I]f courts should not be called upon to supervise the results of a civil service 
examination equally inappropriate would be an investigation of the actual work 
done by the various clerks, in comparison of one with another as to competency, 
attention to duty, etc.  These are matters peculiarly within the province of those 
who are in charge of and superintending the departments, and until Congress by 
some special and direct legislation makes provision to the contrary, we are clear 
that they must be settled by those administrative officers.135 
Lower courts would similarly reject attempts to turn McKinley’s executive order into a basis for 
judicial review of removals on the grounds that “[a]ny other conclusion would, encourage 
inefficiency and incompetency in office, and be fruitful of insubordination.”136  McKinley later 
modestly reduced the scope of civil service protection by expanding the number of federal 
employees who were exempt from competitive examinations.  McKinley took a characteristically 
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direct role in setting these policies.  There can be little question that the key decisions were made 
by him and him alone.137 
But the clearest example of presidential control was McKinley’s supervision of the 
conduct of the Spanish-American War, which represents the single most significant event of his 
presidency.  Not only did the war liberate Cuba from Spanish; when combined with the earlier 
annexation of Hawaii, the acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines as American territory 
also marked the United States’ arrival on the scene as an imperial and colonial power. 
All men close to the White House agreed that McKinley “ran the war on the American 
side.”138  According to one contemporary, “In all the movements of the army and navy the 
President’s hand is seen.”139  Another contemporary commented, “From the first, President 
McKinley assumed a close personal direction, not only of the organization of the forces but of 
the general plan of operations.  He was Commander-in-Chief not merely in name but in fact.”140 
By using the telephone and telegraph, McKinley was able to use “remote voice 
communication for the first time to project presidential presence into the battle zone on a near 
real time basis while he remained in Washington.”141  McKinley would often check in at the War 
Room headquarters to see how things were going, and “[b]y the President’s orders, he was to be 
awakened at any hour of the night if important intelligence should come in.”142  Gould adds, 
“Day by day, and sometimes on an hour-to-hour basis, the president oversaw the war.  In doing 
so, he laid the foundation for the modern presidency.”143  When the war was easily won, 
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McKinley was just as involved in the peace negotiations as he had been in battlefield strategy.  
The “president’s guiding hand [was to be] seen at every point in the negotiations.”144   
In short, the vigor with which McKinley prosecuted the war greatly strengthened the 
presidency.  Gould reports: 
In conducting the Spanish-American War, McKinley had expanded the powers 
and authority of his office.  Some months later, signing an order to shift American 
installations that lay outside the United States, he observed:  “It seems odd to be 
directing the transfer of navy yards, naval stations & c in Cuba.” . . .  In bearing 
and manner, in action and policy, [McKinley] would become something of an 
imperial tutor to the American people.145 
McKinley relied upon the War Power in administering Puerto Rico and Cuba after they 
were conquered and in suppressing an insurrection in the Philippines.146  He also sent troops to 
China during the Boxer Rebellion without congressional authorization.147  His skillful use of the 
War Power “facilitated the accretion of power in the executive and in the federal government 
generally,” and he showed how “broadly and creatively” his office could be used.148   
Gould concludes that “By 1901 the nation had an empire and a president whose manner 
and bearing anticipated the imperial executive of six decades later.”149  In the process, McKinley 
“transformed the presidential office from its late-nineteenth-century weakness into a 
recognizable prototype of its present day form.”150  By the time McKinley died in office of an 
assassin’s bullet, a contemporary journalist was able to write that “in the legislative branch of the 
Government, it is the executive which influences, if it does not control, the action of Congress; 
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while the power originally vested in the executive alone has increased to an extent of which the 
framers of the Constitution had no prophetic vision.”151 
IV. THEODORE ROOSEVELT 
Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency on September 14, 1901, after the 
assassination of McKinley.  The take-charge style that would become the hallmark of his 
administration did not immediately appear.  Roosevelt held his first cabinet meeting on 
September 20th, during which he immediately asked all members of McKinley’s cabinet to stay 
on and received reports on the varied business of their departments.152  Secretary of State Hay, 
who had worked for Lincoln and been close to Garfield, was devastated when his friend 
McKinley became the third president to fall to an assassin’s bullet.  He tried to resign, but 
Roosevelt asked him to stay on.153  As time passed, however, there were “frequent shifts in 
cabinet personnel.”154  After Hay’s health failed in 1905, Roosevelt asked the exceptionally able 
Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to assume the position.155   
Roosevelt came to office at a time when the presidencies of Grover Cleveland and 
William McKinley had produced “a gradual rise in presidential power . . . culminating in the 
emergence of the modern office under McKinley.”156  Roosevelt took this condition and 
supplemented it with the personal presidency:  the people’s attachment to the person and not the 
constitutional office of the presidency.  He was “visible and controversial in a personalized 
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way,”157 and his personal appeal and that of his family gave him a “capacity to keep the nation 
entertained and involved in his conduct.”158 
Through his charisma, he made the presidency the voice of the nation and the 
government, and he led people to think that as president, he was protecting them from a do-
nothing, status quo Congress.  His biographer says that Roosevelt “personalized the office in a 
way that had not occurred since Andrew Jackson.”159  It is no accident that Roosevelt’s role 
models were Jackson and Lincoln, and he repeatedly expressed his belief in “the Jackson-
Lincoln theory of presidential power.”160  As Roosevelt said, the course he “followed, of 
regarding the executive as subject only to the people, and, under the Constitution, bound to serve 
the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution does not explicitly forbid him to render 
services, was substantially the course followed by both Andrew Jackson and Abraham 
Lincoln.”161  Roosevelt rejected the opposite course, which he denigrated as the “narrowly 
legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than the people, and can do 
nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly commands the 
action.”162  Roosevelt chose to follow the path of Old “King Andrew,” as he “had never hesitated 
‘to cut any red tape that stood in the way of executive action.’”163  Roosevelt also greatly admired 
Alexander Hamilton, who believed in strong executive and national power.  He thus saw his 
vision of the presidency as going back to the beginnings of the nation.164  Unsurprisingly, 
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Roosevelt had a very low opinion of Congress as an institution regarding it as “indecisive and 
irresolute,” and “he distrusted the motives of his opponents in both houses.”165  Roosevelt liked 
to  
appeal[ ] over the heads of the Senate and House leaders to the people, who were 
masters of us both.  I continued in this way to get results until almost the close of 
my terms; and the Republican party became once more the progressive and indeed 
the fairly radical progressive party of the Nation.”166 
As president, Roosevelt expanded the scope of presidential power beyond what anyone 
had theretofore imagined.  In his view, the executive branch was the dominant and not merely a 
coordinate branch of the federal government.  Like Lincoln before him, Roosevelt believed that 
the president’s role was not limited to seeing to it that the laws passed by Congress were 
faithfully executed.  As Roosevelt later explained in his autobiography, he regarded the president 
as “a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people.”167  
Under this stewardship theory, “it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the 
needs of the Nation.”168  Theodore Roosevelt’s biographer, Lewis Gould, describes Roosevelt’s 
stewardship theory of presidential power as follows: 
His authority “was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing 
in the Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its constitutional powers.”  
There was no need to wait for “some specific authorization” to take a needed 
action in the public interest.  Instead, the chief executive should act, “unless such 
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.”  As Roosevelt phrased it 
in his autobiography, “I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of 
executive power.”169 
Gould goes on to note that in “his autobiography, Roosevelt asserted that he had been 
prepared to act under ‘the Jackson-Lincoln theory of the presidency’ because ‘occasionally great 
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crises arise which call for immediate and vigorous executive action.”170  Roosevelt was to accuse 
his successor, William Howard Taft, of subscribing to the James Buchanan theory of the 
presidency because of Taft’s apostasy in disagreeing with Roosevelt’s stewardship theory.  Taft 
admired Roosevelt’s goals, but “thought a president should observe the law strictly and not 
construe his authority as broadly as Roosevelt had done.”171  It turned out that during “the time 
they had worked together, [Roosevelt and Taft] had few occasions to sit down and go over their 
contrasting philosophies of the presidency.”172 
A believer in the Progressive faith in expert administration, Roosevelt’s style was “to 
select qualified subordinates and let them exercise their own judgment.”173  A contemporary 
English observer said that Roosevelt had “gathered around him a body of public servants who 
are nowhere surpassed, I question whether they are anywhere equaled, for efficiency, self-
sacrifice, and an absolute devotion to their country’s interests.”174  Gould reports: 
Theodore Roosevelt a gifted and often effective presidential administrator.  He 
usually evoked a high morale from his immediate subordinates, who relished the 
chance to work for such an inspiring executive.  His men admired Roosevelt for 
his willingness to consult them and for his support when they faced a crisis or 
criticism.  Roosevelt handled a great deal of business each day with speed and 
thoroughness.  His ability to read quickly and his retentive mind enabled him to 
move through large amounts off information easily.  He also possessed the 
capacity to make up his mind promptly and decisively.  He did not spend time 
reconsidering the actions he had taken.  When the president’s interest was 
engaged, his administrative talents were impressive.175 
In sum, Roosevelt was a hands-on administrator who was very much in control of the executive 
branch. 
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Given the expansiveness of his views on presidential power, it is no surprise that 
Roosevelt’s actions indicate strong support for the unitary theory of the presidency.  Roosevelt 
maintained strict control of his cabinet, reducing them to mere “echoes and adulators.”176  
Roosevelt also wielded the removal power freely, on several occasions summarily discharging 
several companies of troops.177  Furthermore, and of greatest relevance to this series of articles, 
Roosevelt’s Eighth Annual Message specifically proposed “that all existing independent bureaus 
and commissions . . . be placed under the jurisdiction of appropriate executive departments,” 
arguing that it was “unwise from every standpoint, and results only in mischief, to have any 
executive work done save by the purely executive bodies, under the control of the President; and 
each such executive body should be under the immediate supervision of a Cabinet Minister.”178   
Roosevelt was also not afraid as president to take decisive action.  In the area of law 
enforcement, Roosevelt personally directed investigations into government scandals, naming 
lawyers to serve as special assistants to the Justice Department.179  For example, in 1902, he 
directed that a lawsuit be brought under the Sherman Act to stop a railroad combination,180 and 
he “directed that suitable action should be taken to have the question judicially determined.”181  
In a legal investigation regarding rebates, Roosevelt told his Attorney General, “Please do not 
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file the suit until I hear from you.”182  The White House later told the Attorney General that the 
suit “should be abandoned.”183  In 1903, Roosevelt took vigorous action in response to 
allegations that postal officials were taking bribes and kickbacks in exchange for promotions, 
instructing the official initially assigned to look into the scandal “that I wished nothing but the 
truth and that I wished the whole truth and care not a rap who is hit.”184  Eventually Roosevelt 
appointed Democrat Holmes Conrad and Republican Charles J. Bonaparte as special prosecutors 
to pursue the matter.  Eventually the investigation implicated Assistant Attorney General John 
Tyner as well as Charles Emory Smith and Perry S. Heath, who had been the Postmaster General 
and First Assistant Postmaster General during the McKinley Administration.185   
In 1905, Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Philander Knox, appointed Democrat Francis J. 
Heney to investigate a land fraud scandal implicating former Commissioner of the General Land 
Office Binger Hermann.186  Roosevelt’s use of special prosecutors does not pose the same 
problem for the unitary executive as the independent counsels appointed during the post-
Watergate era, since these special prosecutors were subject to presidential control.187 
The stewardship theory found particularly strong expression in Roosevelt’s actions on 
conservation issues.  Roosevelt and his chief of the Bureau of Forestry, Gifford Pinchot, 
concluded that they could place enormous amounts of western land to the nation’s forest reserves 
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despite the absence of any statutory authority for doing so.  Roosevelt created eighteen national 
monuments during his presidency, and he withdrew sixty-six million acres from public entry in 
1906 alone.188  Ultimately, Congress adopted an amendment “to limit the president’s power to 
create forest reserves.”189  This “was more than just a sign of western impatience over 
conservation policy; it also demonstrated a general congressional dislike for the president’s 
assertion of executive power.”190   
Edmund Morris says of Roosevelt that “he understood better than any President before 
him . . . the executive order.”191  Roosevelt would use an executive order to circumvent Congress 
if it “[p]ersisted in depriving” him of what he needed or wanted.192  Roosevelt also admired 
vigorous executive actions taken by others.  In the summer of 1903, he read of how the governor 
of Indiana had ended a race riot, and he wrote the governor to praise him for “the admirable way 
in which you have vindicated the majesty of the law by your recent action in reference to 
lynching.”193  On another occasion, the president became enchanted with the idea of telling the 
Nicaraguans that an 1846 treaty gave the U.S. the right to go ahead with the building of a canal 
across the isthmus:  this “thesis appealed to Roosevelt’s broad concept of executive power.”194 
Another aspect of Roosevelt’s support for the unitary executive was his policy with 
respect to the civil service.  T.R. was a long-time advocate of civil service reform, having served 
as a Civil Service Commissioner during under both the Harrison and the second Cleveland 
Administrations.  Like McKinley, Roosevelt had to balance the public’s desire for civil service 
reform with GOP demands for patronage hiring.  Gould reports: 
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During his presidency, the classified civil service—positions that were subject to 
competitive examination—grew from just over 46 percent of the total government 
service to 66 percent by the time he stepped down.  The number of classified 
positions increased by more than 116,000, and Roosevelt broadened the number 
of agencies and bureaus that were under civil service rules.  In general, Roosevelt 
issued and enforced regulations to curb federal employees from direct 
involvement in partisan affairs or political campaigns.195 
As noted earlier, because the Civil Service Act did not purport to limit the removal power, 
expanding the classified service enhanced, rather than restricted, the president’s control over the 
administration of the law by insulating executive officials from senatorial courtesy.   
In addition, Roosevelt issued an executive order clarifying that the previous order issued 
by McKinley requiring that removals only be made for “just cause” was only meant to guard 
against the type of politically motivated removals prohibited by the statute and not to impose any 
other substantive limits on the removal power.  The order stated that “for the purpose of 
preventing all such misunderstandings and improper constructions of said section, it is hereby 
declared that the term ‘just cause,’ as used in section 8, Civil Service Rule II, is intended to mean 
any cause, other than one merely political or religious, which will promote the efficiency of the 
service.”196  This was in complete accord with the position advanced by the Civil Service 
Commission197 and made crystal clear that limiting removals to “just cause” did not substantially 
impinge upon the president’s power to remove.198  This conclusion was further bolstered by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Shurtleff, which, although begun during the McKinley years, was 
handed down during Roosevelt’s presidency. 
Another distinctive feature of the Roosevelt Administration was the president’s penchant 
for appointing commissions to advise him on various subjects, often without statutory authority.  
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The most important of these commissions became known as the Keep Commission after its 
chair, Charles Keep.  This commission “addressed the issue of how well the federal government 
functioned.”199  Gould reports: 
The Keep Commission did accomplish worthwhile results on its own, and it 
established an important precedent for future efforts to make the federal 
government more efficient.  The commission saved public money through its 
exposure of lax practices, it reformed some procedures, and it introduced order 
into the routine business of the bureaucracy.  The panel began an examination into 
how supplies were acquired, and it raised the question of salaries and pensions for 
governmental employees.  Above all, it asserted the principle that the president 
should be in control of the management of the executive agencies.  In that sense 
the Keep Commission was a notable forerunner of the reforms that created the 
modern structure of the presidency.200 
Obviously, Theodore Roosevelt was a hands-on administrator who maintained close control over 
his subordinates in the executive branch.  Congress certainly understood that these commissions 
represented Roosevelt’s effort to reduce Congress’s “control over appointments and key 
departments.”201 
Roosevelt’s take-charge-style can be perhaps best encapsulated in one symbolic act that 
his cabinet took at the start of T.R.’s second term.  The entire cabinet resigned before the second 
term began as if to embody through this act where the true authority for their positions rested.  
By “returning to Roosevelt the power of appointment, or reappointment,” his cabinet 
demonstrated that he had ultimate authority not only over their offices but also over their 
agencies and employees.202 
We saw in The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century how the Monroe 
Doctrine, like Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation before it, was a broad exercise of the 
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executive power conferred on the President by the Vesting Clause of Article II.203  The Roosevelt 
Administration was to engage in a similar use of “the executive Power” when it proclaimed the 
famous Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.  Under the Roosevelt Corollary, not only 
did the United States take it upon itself to say hands off the Americas to all European powers; the 
U.S. also asserted the responsibility to keep order in the Americas itself.204  Roosevelt described 
the doctrine the following way: “if the United States sought to say ‘Hands Off’ to the powers of 
Europe, then sooner or later we must Keep order ourselves.”205  Roosevelt elaborated that “What 
we will not permit the great Powers of Europe to do, we will not permit any American republic 
to make it necessary for the great Powers of Europe to do.”206  Gould notes that as “an idea, the 
Roosevelt Corollary suggested the United States had a greater innate political capacity than did 
its Latin neighbors, and it did so in the context of a strong assertion of presidential power.”207  
The Roosevelt corollary, together with Roosevelt’s work in laying the foundation for the digging 
of the Panama Canal208 and his vigorous assertion of U.S. rights in the Perdicaris affair,209 
combined to give his Administration’s foreign policy a distinctively assertive air. 
We have seen that Theodore Roosevelt greatly admired presidents Andrew Jackson and 
Abraham Lincoln, and like them he believed firmly that the Executive Branch was an 
independent interpreter of the Constitution and not bound meekly to follow the Supreme Court.  
Roosevelt said: 
I grew to realize that all that Abraham Lincoln had said about the Dred Scott 
decision could be said with equal truth and justice about the numerous decisions 
which in our own day were erected as bars across the path of social reform, and 
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which brought to naught so much of the effort to secure justice and fair dealing 
for workingmen and workingwomen, and for plain citizens generally.210 
In sum, the Administration of Theodore Roosevelt went far beyond the theory of the 
unitary executive in the claims it made of presidential power.  Not only did T.R. claim a 
presidential power to remove and direct subordinates; Roosevelt’s stewardship theory of 
presidential power also claimed an inherent authority to act in the absence of statute wherever 
action was not forbidden.  As a result, Roosevelt’s vision of the presidency far exceeded the 
claim of inherent presidential power made during the Truman Administration in the Steel Seizure 
Case, which was, we believe, justifiably rejected by the Supreme Court.  Although Lincoln was 
allowed to wield such powers in the spring of 1861,211 that exercise of power was justified, if at 
all, only in light of the crisis that confronted the nation.  As a result, the stewardship theory of 
presidential power has properly been consigned to the dustbin of history.  The powers Roosevelt 
was claiming cannot be safely vested in the hands of any one individual. 
One can reject the excesses of the stewardship theory while still praising the Roosevelt 
Administration’s contribution to asserting and maintaining the unitariness of the executive.  The 
fact that Roosevelt may have overreached should not obscure the fact that under Roosevelt there 
certainly was no acquiescence to any diminution of the president’s powers of removal and 
control over law execution.   
V. WILLIAM H. TAFT 
William Howard Taft’s view of presidential power was considerably more modest than 
Roosevelt’s, and Taft did not follow Roosevelt at all in appealing “over the head of Congress to 
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the people.”212  Taft attacked the stewardship theory as “an unsafe doctrine,” and he disagreed 
with Roosevelt’s view “that the Executive is charged with responsibility for the welfare of all the 
people in a general way, that he is to play the part of a Universal Providence and set all things 
right, and that anything that in his judgment will help the people he ought to do, unless he is 
expressly forbidden not to do it.”213  Taft was appalled that Roosevelt  
had, for example, appointed a number of extralegal, unsalaried commissions and 
denied the right of Congress to limit him in seeking advice from them.  
[Roosevelt had also] used executive agreements with abandon and denied the 
right of the Senate to advise him on his executive duties, although it of course 
must approve nominations and treaties.214 
Taft believed that “[t]he true view of the Executive functions is . . . that the President can 
exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power 
or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise” 
appearing “either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance 
thereof.”215  Critically, Taft goes on to say, “There is no undefined residuum of power which he 
can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest.”216 
Taft’s biographer, Paolo Coletta, argues that Taft had “a juridical rather than political 
conception of the presidency.”217  Taft revealed this in a letter he sent to William Kent where he 
said: 
[W]e have a government of limited power under the Constitution, and we have 
got to work out our problems on the basis of law.  Now if that is reactionary, then 
I am a reactionary. . . .  Pinchot is not a lawyer and I am afraid he is quite willing 
to camp outside the law to accomplish his beneficent purposes.  I have told him so 
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to his face. . . .  I do not undervalue the great benefit that he has worked out, but I 
do find it necessary to look into the legality of his plans.218 
Taft expressed his belief in “following a limited, legal concept of presidential leadership”219 in a 
letter of January 22, 1912, that he sent to Otto T. Bannard, an old friend.  Taft alluded to his 
upcoming battle for reelection against Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and said: 
I am afraid I am in for a hard fight without any knowledge of military strategy, 
and with very little material for organization, but I am going to stay in anyhow. 
. . . I believe I represent a safer and saner view of our government and its 
Constitution than does Theodore Roosevelt, and whether beaten or not I mean to 
continue to labor in the vineyard for those principles.220 
Taft thought his role as president was “to consolidate and to put upon a sound legal modification 
the changes Roosevelt had made.”221  Taft “construed congressional conservation statutes more 
narrowly than did the courts, took a limited view of the power of the presidency itself, and was 
determined to regularize what he considered to be Roosevelt’s extralegal methods regardless of 
the results for conservation.”222  He thus “regularized and legitimatized the work begun under 
Roosevelt” while repudiating his method and the spirit in which his actions were taken.223   
 Coletta contrasts Taft with Roosevelt by saying that 
If Roosevelt could not achieve his purpose on the basis of some constitutional or 
legal power, he would ask if a contemplated move were anywhere prohibited.  If 
it was not, he would act.  Trained in the law, Taft took a conservative and 
legalistic approach to government.  He must find authority in the Constitution or 
in law prior to acting.  There was no undefined residuum of power which he could 
use merely because the public interest required it.224 
Taft argued that Roosevelt should not be elected to a third term in 1912 because “one 
who so little regards Constitutional principles, especially the independence of the judiciary; and 
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one who is so naturally impatient of legal restraints and of due legal procedure, and who has so 
misunderstood what liberty regulated by law is, could not be safely trusted with successive 
Presidential terms.”225  Before long, “Taft was calling Roosevelt a ‘dangerous egotist’ and a 
‘demogogue’” while Roosevelt was calling the man he made president a “puzzlewit” and 
“fathead.”226 
It would be a mistake, however, to construe Taft’s criticism of Roosevelt’s stewardship 
theory as indicating any lack of support for the unitary theory of the executive.  Once a power 
was delegated to the president, Taft acknowledged that “[t]he grants of Executive power are 
necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the Executive within a field of action 
plainly marked for him.”227  Thus, once power was delegated to the Chief Executive, the 
president should be given broad and plenary control over those powers.   
Although Taft never had the opportunity to comment directly on the removal power or 
the unitary executive while he was president, the defenses of the president’s power to remove 
expressed afterwards in his book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers,228 and later in his 
masterful and scholarly opinion in Myers v. United States229 leave no doubt whatsoever that given 
the opportunity, he would have indicated his strong support.  Taft’s opinion in Myers is the Bible 
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of unitary executive scholarship, and there can be no question but that the author of Myers was a 
vigorous defender of the unitary executive.  In Myers, Taft explicitly asserts that “[t]he vesting of 
the executive power in the president was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws,” 
and he further notes that “the natural meaning of the term ‘executive power’ granted the 
President included appointment and removal of executive subordinates.”230  Myers is a 
masterpiece of judicial craftsmanship, and its author fully appreciated and supported the legal 
and historical arguments in favor of the unitary executive. 
The manner in which Taft exercised removal power manifests its importance in unifying 
the execution of the law.  One of the most politically costly episodes was the squabble between 
Forestry Bureau Chief Gifford Pinchot and Interior Secretary Richard Ballinger.  As a holdover 
from the previous administration, Pinchot still supported Roosevelt’s willingness to bring under 
lands within the national forest system despite the absence of authorizing legislation.  Ballinger’s 
background as an attorney led him to favor Taft’s belief that such actions were improper without 
statutory sanction.231  When Taft resolved this rift in federal policy by siding with Ballinger, 
Pinchot, who was an idealist232 with a penchant for martyrdom,233 attempted to take the matter to 
Congress and the people.  The crux of Pinchot’s allegations was that Ballinger had given 
preferential treatment to a former client in recognizing homestead claims to certain coal-bearing 
lands.  Taft had no choice but to remove him from office, saying: 
[I]f I were to pass over this matter in silence, it would be most demoralizing to the 
discipline of the executive branch of government.  By your own conduct you have 
destroyed your usefulness as a helpful subordinate of the government, and it 
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therefore now becomes my duty to direct the secretary of agriculture to remove 
you from your office as the forester.234 
The furor became so great that the controversy became known as the “American Dreyfus 
case.”235  A congressional investigation ensued that ultimately exonerated Ballinger.236  
Congressional supporters of conservation attempted to pass a resolution calling for Ballinger’s 
removal, but it failed to receive the support of either the committee or the full Senate.  Ballinger 
eventually resigned, citing health reasons.237 
Taft’s support for the unitary executive is also evident in his policies towards the civil 
service.  His belief in efficiency made him a modest supporter of civil service reform.  He began 
in 1910 by extending the classified service to cover consular officers, subordinate diplomatic 
officials, and first-class and second-class assistant postmasters and clerks.  He followed that in 
1912 by extending civil service protection to twenty thousand skilled workers in navy yards and 
thirty-five thousand third-class and fourth-class postmasters.238 
Even more importantly, Taft reaffirmed the position taken by McKinley and Roosevelt 
emphasizing that the executive orders limiting removals to “just cause” did not impose any 
substantive limits on the president’s power to remove.239  This requirement was ultimately 
codified by the Lloyd-LaFollete Act, which limited removals to “such cause as will promote the 
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efficiency of [the civil] service.”240  The legislative history provides little insight into what this 
standard required.241  Most notably, nothing in the legislative history questioned the president’s 
power to remove for any reason,242 and the Civil Service Commission would construe the 
provision as not placing any limits on the president’s removal power.  As the Civil Service 
Commission explained: 
 The rules are not framed on a theory of life tenure, fixed permanence, nor 
vested right in office.  It is recognized that subordination and discipline are 
essential, and that therefore dismissal for just cause shall be not unduly hampered. 
. . . Appointing officers, therefore, are entirely free to make removals for any 
reasons relating to the interests of good administration, and they are made the 
final judges of the sufficiency of the reasons. . . .  
 . . . The rule is merely intended to prevent removals upon secret charges 
and to stop political pressure for removals. . . . No tenure of office is created 
except that based upon efficiency and good behavior; and it remains as much the 
duty of an appointing officer to remove a classified employee for inefficiency as it 
is not to discriminate against him in any way for political or religious reasons.243 
Thus even after codification by the Lloyd-Lafollette Act, the clause limiting removals for 
“cause” continued not to impose any substantive limits on the removal power.244  Courts during 
this period repeatedly held that the executive has unlimited discretion in determining what 
constitutes adequate cause for removal,245 an outcome that some condemned as judicial 
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abnegation.246  Hints of substantive limits to removals would not emerge until after the period 
covered by this Article.247  
Taft’s interest in executive reorganization provides further evidence of his support for 
presidential control over the administration of the law.  Taft “lamented the proliferation of 
departments and . . . asserted the need for a thorough reorganization of the executive 
structure.”248  He hoped that “[b]y similarly grouping . . . related functions he could thus control 
the administrative agencies of the government.”249   
The Taft Administration enjoyed some modest success in undertaking administrative 
reorganizations of the Departments of State, War, and the Navy as well as the reorganization of 
the Customs Service by executive order.250  He launched a broader initiative in 1910 when he 
obtained funding for a Commission on Economy and Efficiency.251  Taft was appalled by the 
overlap in agency responsibilities and the use of inconsistent record keeping and accounting 
systems.  Taft was thus the first president “to have the federal administration studied in detail as 
one mechanism.”252   
A related problem was the president’s inability to control the budget process.  Until 1909, 
each executive agency submitted its own budget proposal which the Treasury Secretary would 
compile into a “Book of Estimates.”  The inaccuracy of these estimates and the lack of 
coordination in the budget process had forced Congress to enact a seemingly incessant stream of 
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supplemental appropriations.  Frustrated with this situation, Congress enacted an appropriations 
rider directing the Treasury Secretary to transmit a detailed statement of the Book of Estimates to 
the president so that “he may . . . advise the Congress how in his judgment the estimated 
appropriations could with the least injury to the public service be reduced so as to bring the 
appropriations within the estimated revenues, or, that he may recommend to Congress such loans 
or new taxes as may be needed to cover the deficiency.”253  Budget reform also became a major 
agenda item for the Commission on Economy and Efficiency.   
The Commission’s report recommended a sweeping reorganization of the executive 
branch, standardization of the federal government’s accounting practices, significant decreases in 
the number of federal employees, and a marked reduction in public works projects.  It also 
proposed that the current budget system be abolished and that instead each executive department 
submit its estimates to the president, who would integrate the proposals into a coherent national 
budget.254  Taft forwarded the Commission’s recommendations to Congress and ordered the 
department heads to prepare budget estimates in the manner recommended by the Commission in 
addition to the traditional one to be forwarded directly to Congress.255 
The Commission’s proposal met with a frosty reception on Capitol Hill.  As Coletta 
notes, “Congress spurned Taft’s recommendations largely because they weakened its power over 
the purse and reduced the areas of control its committees had over federal finances and 
administrative policies.”256  Rather than act on the report’s recommendations, Congress 
responded by attaching a rider to a pending appropriations bill directing executive officials to 
submit budget estimates “only in the form and at the time now required by law, and in no other 
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form and at no other time.”257  Taft signed the measure, but ignored its provisions and attached to 
the traditional Book of Estimates a presidential budget of the type recommended by the 
Commission.258  In defense of his actions, Taft pointed out that “[t]he President is the 
constitutional head of an organization that is continental in scope” who bore the constitutional 
duty to send to Congress “a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures” and 
to make such recommendations to Congress as “he shall judge necessary and expedient.”259  
Congress essentially nullified Taft’s actions by ignoring his budget proposal.260   
Despite their lack of success, Taft’s efforts to strengthen the president’s control over the 
administration of the law were important steps in the long process of protecting consolidating the 
president’s authority to execute the law.  As Leonard White notes: 
The work of the Keep Committee and of President Taft’s Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency . . . are visible symbols not only of a transfer of initiative 
for administrative reform from the legislative to the executive branch, but also of 
the tipping of the constitutional balance from Congress to the President of the 
United States.  This shift was momentous and not reversed.261 
In sum, William Howard Taft was more a lawyer and a judge at heart than he was a 
vigorous executive.  In his book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, and in his scholarly and 
masterful opinion in Myers v. United States, Taft made his name as the president who wrote at 
the greatest length and in the most depth to defend the president’s possession of the removal 
power and the theory of the unitary executive.  His support for the Commission on Economy and 
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Efficiency also represents an important assertion of the president’s authority to execute the law.  
Thus, despite his relatively modest vision of presidential power, neither Taft’s words nor deeds 
are properly regarded as acquiescing in any diminution of the unitary executive. 
VI. WOODROW WILSON 
Presidential support for the unitary executive continued during the administration of 
Woodrow Wilson.  That Wilson would emerge as a major champion of presidential power came 
as something of a surprise.  His doctoral thesis, which became a well known and widely 
acclaimed 1885 book entitled Congressional Government,262 remains one of the classic 
endorsements of parliamentary government.  Written in the wake of a series of relatively weak 
presidents that had been dominated by the Reconstruction Congresses, Congressional 
Government dismisses the presidency as a weak office, concerned with “mere administration” 
and with the chief executive reduced to little more than “the first official of a carefully-graded 
and impartially regulated civil service system.”263  Beneath the president were arrayed the various 
executive departments, each operating with relative independence such that “the President cannot 
often be really supreme in matters of administration.”264  In short, “Our latter-day Presidents live 
by proxy; they are executive in theory, but the Secretaries are the executive in fact.”265  Even the 
cabinet secretaries “are not in fact the directors of the executive policy of the government.”266  
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True control of the administration lay with Congress.267  And congressional policy with respect to 
administration was dictated by the standing committees,268 which were vulnerable to special 
interest pressures and unresponsive to the popular will.269   
In addition, Congressional Government asserted that the constitutional commitment to 
the separation of powers was a “grievous mistake” and a “radical defect in our constitutional 
system” that prevented either the president and Congress from emerging as the “supreme 
ultimate head . . . which can decide at once and with conclusive authority what shall be done at 
those times when some decision there must be.”270  Under the best of circumstances, the division 
of authority led to deadlock; in times of duress, it led to a “paralysis in moment of emergency” 
that can be “fatal.”271  At this point, Wilson thought that the best way to make the federal 
government more responsive to the public will would be to adopt a more parliamentary style of 
government, in which members of Congress also served as heads of executive departments and 
the government was subject to votes of no confidence.272  Under such a vision, Congress would 
clearly emerge as the locus of federal power, and administrative head was no longer the primary 
part of the presidential portfolio. 
Over time, however, Wilson’s views on the proper allocation of power between the 
presidency and Congress evolved.  The examples of a vigorous presidency set by Grover 
Cleveland, William McKinley, and especially Theodore Roosevelt changed Wilson’s thinking.  
Kendrick Clements, Wilson’s biographer, notes that 
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 By 1908, after his own experience of executive power at Princeton and 
after seven years of Theodore Roosevelt’s vigorous national leadership, Wilson 
was ready to find in the presidency the possibilities of leadership and national 
unification that he had so long sought.  “We have grown more inclined,” he said 
that year in a series of published lectures delivered at Columbia University, “to 
look to the President as the unifying force in our complex system, the leader both 
of his party and of the nation.” 
 The president’s leadership of his party gave him influence over Congress, 
Wilson argued in 1908, but more importantly his standing as the interpreter of the 
country’s instinctive wishes and desires made him a unique national figure . . ..273 
The transformation of Wilson’s views are manifest in the rather striking shift in tone and 
focus taken in Wilson’s second master work, which was published in 1908:  Constitutional 
Government in the United States.274  Wilson noted that the country “ha[d] grown more and more 
inclined . . . to look to the President as the unifying force in our complex system.”275  Wilson 
elaborated: 
His is the only national voice in affairs.  Let him once win the admiration and 
confidence of the country, and no other single voice can withstand him, no 
combination of forces will easily overpower him.  His position takes the 
imagination of the country.  He is the representative of no constituency, but of the 
whole people.276 
Wilson continued: 
If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is 
irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so much as when its 
President is of such insight and caliber.  It is for this reason that it will often prefer 
to choose a man rather than a party.  A President whom it trusts can not only lead 
it, but form it to his views.277 
Wilson’s change in heart can best be explained by his desire for vigor in government.  Simply 
put, by 1908 he had concluded that the president was better institutionally situated than Congress 
to provide the necessary leadership.  Although Wilson had previously viewed administration as 
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essentially a mechanical process of carrying out political decisions made by Congress, he came 
to appreciate that administrative actions were themselves an important source of public law.278  
As such, all administration needed to be subject to presidential control.279 
Clements describes Wilson’s attitude as one of “glorification of the presidency,” in which 
the chief executive possessed “extraordinary potential power deriving from his triple functions as 
party leader, symbol of national unity, and interpreter of the wishes of the people.”280  These 
views would only strengthen during Wilson’s service as Governor of New Jersey, which set the 
stage for his election as president.  It was “a remarkable change from Wilson’s earlier belief that 
leadership should be lodged in the legislature and was a slightly ominous foretaste of the 
‘imperial presidency’ of half a century later.”281 
These commitments were evident in the way that Wilson conducted his administration.  
Wilson had long recognized the constitutional foundations of the president’s removal power.  
Even Wilson’s early, pro-parliamentary writings condemned the Tenure of Office Act as 
“repugnant . . . to the original theory of the Constitution.”282  The manner in which Wilson 
wielded the removal power manifests that this belief was no mere paper commitment.  Wilson 
did not hesitate to dismiss cabinet officials or put them in a situation where they felt they needed 
to resign.  Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan resigned believing that Wilson was 
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unnecessarily pushing America into World War I.  William C. Redfield, the first Secretary of the 
Department of Commerce, resigned, believing Wilson was not supportive enough of business.  
And, most dramatically, Wilson fired Secretary of State Robert Lessing.283  Indeed, Wilson was 
to fight with his cabinet for acting independently of him even when he was incapacitated by his 
stroke.284  CHECK EBERLEIN V. U.S., 257 U.S. 82, 84 (1921) REMOVED THEN 
REINSTATED AFTER CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT PROVED UNFOUDNED.  
SOUGHT SALARY.  Called it “settled” that removals are “not subject to revision in the 
courts.”  257 US. at 84.  SIMILARLY KELLOM v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 174 (CT CL 
1920) (holding that determination of whether the evidence supported removal “belongs to 
the proper officials of the proper department and not to the court”).  CHARTURVEDI 
309-10; Merrill 199 & sources cited (Westwood; Mayers).  And perhaps most importantly, 
Wilson directed his Postmaster General to dismissal Frank S. Myers as Postmaster First Class.  
Although the removal of a fairly minor federal official would not ordinarily be noteworthy, in 
this case it would provide the basis for the Supreme Court’s most important decision regarding 
the removal power:  Myers v. United States.285 
In addition, Wilson opposed numerous congressional attempts to infringe upon his 
authority to execute the laws.  For example, on May 13, 1920, Wilson vetoed an appropriations 
bill which subjected the printing of magazines by executive agencies to the prior approval of the 
Joint Committee on Printing as “an invasion of the province of the Executive.”286  As Wilson 
further asserted: 
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The Congress and the Executive should function within their respective 
spheres. . . .  The Congress has the power and the right to grant or deny an 
appropriation, or to enact or refuse to enact a law; but once an appropriation is 
made or a law is passed, the appropriation should be administered or the law 
executed by the executive branch of the Government.  In no other way can the 
Government be efficiently managed and responsibility definitely fixed.287 
This same veto message also criticized a provision of a previous appropriations act giving the 
Public Buildings Commission, a body that included four members of Congress, absolute control 
of and the allotment of all space in federal buildings in the District of Columbia.288 
Even more significant was Wilson’s veto of the Budget and Accounting Act the 
following month.  This Act would have largely implemented the recommendations of Taft’s 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency by authorizing presidential coordination of the budget 
process through the newly created Bureau of the Budget.  The Act would also have established a 
General Accounting Office (GAO) headed by the Comptroller General, which would have had 
the power to conduct audits to verify that the administration allocated federal funds in 
accordance with the appropriations legislation enacted by Congress.  To insure that the 
Comptroller General and the GAO possessed the independence from the executive branch 
needed to conduct a proper audit, the Act would have made the Comptroller General removable 
only by concurrent resolution, a legislative device that merely required the assent of both houses 
of Congress and did not require the president’s signature.  Had the Act stopped there, it might 
not have drawn Wilson’s ire.  Unfortunately, the Act also assigned to the Comptroller General 
the responsibilities of pre-approving all expenditures and of adjusting accounts that were 
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previously assigned to the Comptrollers and the auditors of the Treasury Department—
responsibilities that were clearly executive in nature.289 
Despite his avid support for the proposal, Wilson nonetheless vetoed this measure on the 
grounds that it shielded an officer wielding executive power from direct presidential removal.  
As Wilson noted in his veto message, “the Congress is without constitutional powers to limit . . . 
the power of removal derived from the Constitution.”  Wilson reasoned, “[i]t has . . . always been 
the accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this kind 
carries with it, as an incident, the power to remove.”290  Consequently Wilson concluded, 
“Regarding as I do the power of removal from office as an essential incident to the appointing 
power, I cannot escape the conclusion that the vesting of this power of removal in the Congress 
is unconstitutional and therefore I am unable to approve the bill.”291  Thus even in a situation 
such as this, where adopting the contrary position would have had the practical effect of greatly 
enhancing the president’s power, Wilson remained true to the unitary theory of the executive. 
Wilson made other efforts to centralize  his control of the execution of the laws.  His 
initial efforts to reorganize the government foundered in the face of strong congressional 
opposition.  However, the exigencies of World War I finally led to the passage of the Overman 
Act of 1918, which authorized Wilson to coordinate and consolidate executive agencies by 
executive order.292  Armed with this authority, Wilson issued twenty-four executive orders that, 
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among other things, placed the work of all law officers under the supervision of the Attorney 
General and centralized control of all health activities under the Secretary of the Treasury.293  
Although the Overman Act limited the reorganization power to war-related agencies and 
prohibited the abolition of any agency, it did lay the foundation for the reorganization proposals 
which were to follow.294  
The Wilson Administration also bore witness to the birth of three additional independent 
agencies:  the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the U.S. 
Shipping Board.295  The members of each of these bodies were protected by the same removal 
restrictions contained in the amended Interstate Commerce Act, limiting removals to 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”296  Interestingly, the statute establishing the 
Federal Reserve Board failed to include any removal limits whatsoever.297 
Like Cleveland, Wilson offered no objections to the creation of these independent 
agencies or the inclusion of the restrictions on his removal power.  As during the Cleveland 
Administration, however, it would be dangerous to read too much into Wilson’s failure to object.  
As we have noted earlier, it is doubtful that Congress intended the language in the original 
Interstate Commerce Act to preclude the president from removing commissioners over 
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disagreements over policy.298  As Robert Cushman, the leading early commentator on the history 
of the independent regulatory commissions, has noted, the for-cause removal protections of the 
Interstate Commerce Act were regarded “more as a protection to the public by providing a way 
to get rid of objectionable commissioners than as a limitation on Presidential authority.”299  In 
addition, the removal provisions prompted little discussion, suggesting that Congress did not 
view these restrictions as a key to determining the commissions’ independence.300  The scant 
legislative history that does exist suggests that Congress probably did not have any clear idea of 
the relationship between the independent agencies and the president.301  If anything, the 
legislative history suggests that Congress regarded the removal provisions in the FTC Act as a 
check on the Commission’s power, not the president’s, and that Congress thought about the 
FTC’s independence in terms of freedom from bipartisanship rather than freedom from 
presidential control.302   
In fact, during consideration of the FTC Act, Wilson insisted that the commission remain 
relatively weak, reflecting his view that the Commission was “an executive agency charged with 
executive and administrative duties” and that “the commission was merely to supplement 
existing law-enforcement agencies.”303  Wilson’s theory seems to have won the day, as he 
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“secured the inclusion in the Federal Trade Commission Act [of] the clause authorizing the 
President to direct the commission to make certain investigations.”304  Cushman goes on to note: 
Throughout the discussions of this whole period there runs an underlying 
assumption that the commission’s policy, if not actually directed from the White 
House, at least conforms to the President’s wishes, that the President cannot 
escape responsibility for the commission’s policy, and that an incoming President 
objecting to such policy should change it, if not by the actual issuance of orders to 
the Commission, at least by making of suitable appointments.305 
The conclusion that Congress intended these new commissions to operate subject to 
presidential control is further reinforced when the removal provisions are read in light of the 
statutes’ other provisions.  For example, the Federal Reserve Board as constituted in 1914 
included both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Treasury as ex officio 
members specifically to insure that the executive branch would be able to exert an appropriate 
degree of control over monetary policy.306  Similarly, the FTC Act specifically authorized the 
president to direct the FTC’s investigatory activities.307  Moreover, the act creating the U.S. 
Shipping Board clearly envisaged that the Board would exercise important managerial duties 
under the direction of the president.  In fact, the year after the U.S. Shipping Board was 
established, the exigencies of World War I led Congress to enact legislation giving the president 
new powers to control shipbuilding,308 authority which he promptly delegated to the Board.309  
The Board acknowledged that it would exercise “solely as the agent of the President,”310 and it 
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was universally regarded as such throughout the conduct of World War I.311  After the war ended, 
Congress would transfer some of the president’s authority back to the board.312  The clear role for 
presidential involvement in these commission’s operations vitiates any suggestion that they were 
intended to be independent of presidential control. 
Moreover, Wilson’s treatment of these new institutions underscored that he did not 
regard them as independent of his authority.  As Cushman has concluded, “There is no doubt that 
Wilson . . . felt that he was entitled to impress his policies on the independent commissions and 
to expect their conformity to those policies.”313  Accordingly, Wilson did not hesitate to use his 
power to direct FTC investigations, launching many of the FTC’s major initiatives.314  Wilson 
also threatened to remove the entire Federal Reserve Board for disagreeing with his polices, 
despite the statutory restrictions that purported to limit his removal authority.315   
But the most compelling explanation for why Wilson failed to object to these provisions 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Shurtleff.  The removal language included in these new 
statutes was identical to the language held in Shurtleff as not placing any limits on the president’s 
power to remove.  Therefore, Congress was doubtless aware that under Supreme Court 
precedent, including the same language in the FTC Act and the Shipping Act appears to made 
the members of the bodies created by those statutes removable at will.  This conclusion is 
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reinforced by the fact that in 1908, five years after Shurtleff, Congress amended the statute at 
issue in Shurtleff to make explicit that general appraisers of customs could be removed for cause 
and for no other reason.  The decision to employ language identical to that used in Shurtleff 
rather than the language used in the amended customs statute would thus appear to be no 
accident and raises the strong inference that Congress did not intend to limit the president’s 
power to remove members of the FTC or the U.S. Shipping Board.316  In light of Shurtleff, the 
FTC was not truly an independent agency and would not become one until the Supreme Court’s 
1935 activist decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.317 
The eventual emergence of Wilson’s views regarding the centrality of the institution of 
the presidency and his strong opposition to repeated congressional attempts to interfere with his 
authority to execute the laws appear to provide strong support for the unitary executive.  
Although three new independent agencies were created under his administration without his 
objection, the evidence that neither Congress nor Wilson regarded these commissions to be 
independent of presidential control is more than sufficient to overcome any suggestion that 
Wilson acquiesced to any derogation of his authority to control the execution of the law. 
VII. WARREN G. HARDING 
The presidency of Warren Harding is consistently ranked as one of the worst, if not the 
worst, in our nation’s history.318  A congenial man who abjured conflict, Harding was by nature 
most comfortable remaining outside the fray and conciliating divergent interests.  This outlook 
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made him deeply suspicious of strong presidential power, which he believed could only lead 
troubled relations with Congress, as it had during the Wilson Administration.  As a result, he 
attempted to pay respect to Congress’s prerogatives by adopting a narrow conception of 
presidential power.  This vision turned the presidency into a largely ceremonial office whose 
main purpose was to serve as a beloved source of national pride.  There was little room in it for 
political leadership.319  Harding’s legacy was ultimately consumed by a series of scandals, which 
culminated in the conviction and imprisonment of one of his cabinet secretaries for accepting 
bribes for the oil leases in Teapot Dome.320  If ever there were a president who might have been 
expected to abandon the unitary executive, it was Harding. 
Viewed in this light, Harding’s record in defending the president’s authority to execute 
the laws may be regarded as something of a pleasant surprise.  Harding did not hesitate to take 
steps to ensure in the independent agencies acted in accord with the administration’s policy 
agenda.  His actions included communicating his preferred policy positions to members of the 
ICC321 and the Shipping Board,322 requiring commissioners to submit their undated resignations 
before receiving their appointments,323 and ignoring the statutory provisions purporting to limit 
presidential removal authority and threatening to remove Shipping Board members who 
disagreed with his policies.324  Even more important were his efforts to reconstitute the 
independent agencies with members more in tune with his pro-business orientation.  Harding 
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made a number of transformative appointments to the ICC, the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. 
Tariff Commission, and the FTC that effectively brought the regulatory program of the 
progressive era to an end.325 
Believing that promoting efficiency would make the government more responsive to 
business, Harding also embraced efforts to reorganize the executive branch.326  He appointed his 
good friend Walter F. Brown as the Chair of the joint congressional committee on reorganization 
established at the end of the Wilson Administration.  The plan Brown developed called for 
wholesale consolidation of the federal bureaucracy into ten departments.327  Most importantly for 
our purposes, the proposal reiterated the position first advanced by Teddy Roosevelt and 
recommended that the independent agencies be consolidated into the executive departments.328  
This plan prompted a spate of bureaucratic infighting that rendered its enactment a practical 
impossibility.  Although some cabinet members were able to achieve some limited success in 
modernizing the operations of their departments, plans to impose more extensive changes were 
eventually ended by Harding’s untimely death and the advent of the Coolidge Administration, 
which did not share Harding’s interest in executive branch reorganization.329 
But the most important step Harding took to bolster the unitary executive was the 
completion of the effort to establish a Bureau of the Budget initiated by Taft and continued by 
Wilson.  Under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,330 “[t]he Bureau of the Budget was 
made part of the executive branch, reporting to the president.  The budget director was not to 
take instruction from cabinet officers but only from the president, which gave the director the 
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authority to plan a responsible budget without constant interference.”331  The impact on the 
president’s ability to control his administration was palpable and immediate.  Under the 
leadership of the very able Charles Dawes, the Bureau of the Budget was able to save over $1 
billion during its first year of operation.332  Even more importantly, the Bureau allowed the 
president to exert far more control over federal spending than ever before.333 
Ironically, Harding’s greatest achievement in asserting the president’s authority to 
execute the law was simultaneously his greatest failure.  Attached to the legislation creating the 
Bureau of the Budget was a provision creating the General Accounting Office headed by a 
Comptroller General appointed to a fifteen-year term and removable by joint resolution, rather 
than by concurrent resolution as proposed during the Wilson Administration.334  Because a joint 
resolution necessarily requires the president’s signature to be effective, this provision guaranteed 
presidential participation in any removals.  The use of a joint resolution, however, prevented the 
president from initiating the removal of the Comptroller General and from exercising the 
removal power without congressional consent.  These were precisely the problems that induced 
Wilson to veto the previous version of the Budget and Accounting Act, notwithstanding his avid 
support for the bill.  Harding failed to follow suit and signed the Act into law.335 
Harding’s failure to object to the limits on the president’s power to remove the 
Comptroller General undeniably constitutes a blow to the unitary executive.  At worst, however, 
Harding’s approval of the Budget and Accounting Act represents something of a mixed bag.  The 
case can be made that the simultaneous creation of the Bureau of the Budget greatly enhanced 
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the president’s ability to execute the laws and control the executive branch.  To his credit, 
Harding did use the full capabilities of the Bureau of the Budget to assert his control over 
executive agencies, establishing firm control over the budget process and requiring agencies to 
submit all legislative proposals that might involve presidential spending to the Bureau of the 
Budget for clearance.336  Harding’s reorganization proposal also recommended that the newly 
created General Accounting Office be transferred into the Treasury Department.337  This initiative 
was ultimately doomed by Congress’s failure to embrace any aspect of Harding’s reorganization 
plan. 
Ultimately, Harding’s legacy would be undone by his decision to include in his cabinet 
two personal friends who subsequently became enmeshed in scandal.  Ironically, most of 
Harding’s major executive and judicial nominees were men of outstanding talent and ability.  
Harding appointed the very talented Charles Evans Hughes to be Secretary of State, and he 
named the brilliant Andrew W. Mellon Secretary of the Treasury.  Rising star Herbert Hoover 
was named Secretary of Commerce, and the formidable William Howard Taft was nominated to 
be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  Harding’s biographers, Eugene Trani and David Wilson, 
observe, “For quality it would be hard to surpass men such as Hoover, Hughes, and [Agriculture 
Secretary Henry] Wallace.”338  It is thus ironic that two bad appointments—Albert Fall as 
Secretary of the Interior and Harry Daugherty as Attorney General—would forever besmirch the 
reputation of an administration led by an otherwise distinguished cabinet.  Mercifully, Harding 
died unaware of the damage that his friends’ improprieties would do to his reputation.339 
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On the whole, Harding’s record in defending the unitariness of the executive is somewhat 
equivocal.  Notwithstanding his rather constrained vision of the proper scope of presidential 
power, Harding did take a number of steps to defend the president’s authority to execute the law, 
as evidenced by his willingness to dominate the independent agencies and to populate the 
executive branch with an able cabinet staffed by giants like Charles Evans Hughes and Andrew 
Mellon.  Even more important is Harding’s role in creating the Bureau of the Budget, which is 
regarded by many as one of his administration’s more significant achievements340 and which 
represents the precursor to the agency that has become the presidency’s primary mechanism for 
centralizing control of the administration of the law:  the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB).   
At the same time, it is undeniable that Harding’s failure to maintain Wilson’s objections 
to the restrictions on the removal of the Comptroller General constitutes a clear failure of a 
president to defend the unitariness of the executive branch.  Also somewhat troublesome is 
Harding’s reluctance to enforce the mandates of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead 
Act of 1919.  Harding was the first president burdened with having to balance the political 
unpopularity of Prohibition and the obligation to enforce the law.  The contradiction between his 
public support for Prohibition on the one hand and the implications of his personal habits and the 
almost farcical level of enforcement on the other hand do not do Harding much credit.341  When 
viewed in light of the overall historical record, however, these episodes provide at most modest 
support for the claim that Harding acquiesced to a non-unitary executive branch.  Unfortunately, 
what little good Harding was able to accomplish has largely been eclipsed by the Teapot Dome 
scandal, which surfaced after his death and which is described in the next section. 
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VIII. CALVIN COOLIDGE 
Warren Harding’s death elevated Calvin Coolidge to the presidency.  A reticent man who 
reflected many of the values of his rural New England roots, “Silent Cal” was the antithesis of 
the activist president.  On the contrary, Walter Lippmann reported that his “political genius” was 
“his talent for effectively doing nothing.”342 
Coolidge’s reluctance to assume national leadership or to impose his will on Congress, 
however, did not translate into reluctance to defend the president’s prerogatives.  Coolidge was 
more than willing to fight to assert the president’s sole right to control of the execution of the 
federal laws.  For instance, the degree of influence Coolidge exerted over the independent 
agencies indicates that he envisioned them as being subject to his will.  Reportedly believing that 
the FTC and other commissions “should subordinate their judgment to the opinions of the 
executive” and that “they properly were mere agencies to register the policies of the 
administration,”343 Coolidge attempted to dominate the independent agencies by influencing the 
rediscount policy of the Federal Reserve Board, dictating policy to the U.S. Shipping Board, 
requiring that commissioners submit undated letters of resignation before appointing them, and 
threatening to remove commissioners who disagreed with his policies.344  The fact that the 
threatened removal of these commissioners failed to evoke any congressional protests suggests 
that Congress also did not regard the statutory removal restrictions as vitiating any of the 
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president’s constitutional powers.345  He moved carefully but firmly to create a protectionist 
majority on the Tariff Commission, removing one commissioner and appointing another to be an 
ambassador to give himself a vacancy to fill.346  A third low-tariff commissioner was driven to 
resign in 1928 as Coolidge established complete control over the commission.347  The fact that 
from 1927 to 1929 Congress made expenditures of appropriations with respect to the merchant 
marine conditional on approval by the president and not the U.S. Shipping Board further 
contradicts any suggestion that Congress thought that the independent agencies should exercise 
their authority completely independently of executive control.348 
Coolidge further exerted control over the independent agencies by appointing 
commissioners who were sympathetic to his pro-business policies.  These efforts culminated 
with the appointment of William E. Humphrey to the Chairmanship of the FTC.349  Humphrey 
bragged about the impact of his appointment, noting that “[i]f [the FTC] was going east before, it 
is going west now.”350  He added, “Do you think I would have a body of men working here under 
me that did not share my ideas about these matters?  Not on your life.  I would not hesitate a 
minute to cut their heads off if they disagreed with me.  What in the hell do you think I am here 
for?”351 
These rather extreme statements by Humphrey are important because they reveal the 
extent to which the independent agencies were in tune with Coolidge’s basic policies.  It is clear 
that both Harding and Coolidge moved very aggressively to turn the direction of the independent 
agencies around 180 degrees.  While the merits of the laissez-faire policy they pursued are open 
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to dispute, there can be no question but that Harding and Coolidge ensured that these agencies 
acted in accordance with the vision determined by the president notwithstanding the supposed 
statutory guarantees of independence.  Humphrey’s aggressive statements about his own role in 
implementing Coolidge’s laissez-faire policies certainly help to explain why FDR was so eager 
to remove him in the litigation that ultimately became Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.352 
Coolidge also used his control over the executive branch and the new powers vested in 
the president by Harding’s creation of the Bureau of the Budget to rein in the federal debt.   As 
president, he saw the federal debt drop from $22.3 billion in 1923 when he took office to $16.9 
billion in 1929 when he left office, a dramatic reduction indeed.353  Robert Ferrell, Coolidge’s 
biographer, reports: 
In holding down government expenditures and saving enough money to retire the 
debt, Coolidge employed several devices, one of which was the Bureau of the 
Budget.  The very fact that the Bureau’s statisticians and accountants were 
screening the proposed expenses of cabinet departments and the independent 
agencies gave comfort to the parsimonious president.  The bureau’s experts also 
could watch for special proposals by those well-known spendthrifts, the members 
of Congress.  When the president presented his annual budget he could feel fairly 
sure that it was as low as he properly should go, and not a crazy quilt of special 
interest propositions.354 
Thus, the Bureau of the Budget proved its usefulness to the presidency from its inception thus 
compensating for Harding’s agreement to removal limits for the Comptroller General. 
The most significant step that the Coolidge Administration took to defend the unitary 
executive was its role in briefing and arguing Myers v. United States,355 which is the most 
important case ever decided on the scope of the president’s removal power.  The Coolidge 
Administration’s role in Myers began when the administration continued to defend Wilson’s 
                                                 
352 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
353 FERRELL, supra note 346, at 167. 
354 Id. at 168. 
355 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art11
 74
removal of Lois Myers in defiance of the statutory restriction on the removal of postmasters.356  
In the brief and oral argument presented to the U.S. Supreme Court, Solicitor General James M. 
Beck offered a series of ringing statements on the very exact controversy that is the subject of 
these articles.  Beck’s brief argued that “[f]rom the Beginning of the Government removal has 
been recognized as essentially an executive function.”357  The Constitutional Convention did not 
discuss the removal power because its members thought it was “axiomatic that the power to 
remove was an executive power and that it was included within the grant of ‘executive power’ to 
the president and the special grant that he should ‘take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.’”358  Beck further observed: 
There is however, a very significant difference between the first sections of Art. I 
and Art. II, respectively.  Art. I, Sect. 1, provides:  “All legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”  Art. II, Sect. 1, 
provides: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President.”  It does not use 
the words “herein granted,” nor does it speak of a class of powers as the preceding 
section, but it speak of the “executive power”, and the executive power, as 
understood at that time always included both the power to appoint and the power 
to remove.359 
Beck’s brief goes on to recount the whole history of the removal power from the 
Decision of 1789 of the First Congress up through the controversy in the Jackson and Johnson 
Administrations, and it quotes the many Attorney General opinions defending a unilateral 
presidential power of removal.360  The brief is a ringing defense of the unitary executive that 
makes every constitutional argument for that outcome that can be made. 
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Beck reiterated many of these positions during oral argument.  He said, “In my judgment, 
the President can remove any one in the Executive Department of the Government.”361  Beck 
went on to say that the executive power was 
not granted to an Executive Department.  That is, again, a very significant thing.  
They might have limited it.  But they said: “The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States”—distinguishing him from all the other 
servants of the Executive Department, and making him the repository of this vast, 
undefined grant of power called “the executive power.”  Then they went on to say 
what that power was—not in any way attempting to classify or enumerate it; but 
they simply gave its objective, and that was “to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.   
 It was common sense in the days of the Fathers, when our country was a 
little one; it is common sense today, when we are the greatest nation in the world; 
when we have as I say 800,000 employees of the State—that the President can not 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless he has the power of removal, 
and the summary power of removal, without any interference or curb upon him.  
And that has been shown again and again in our history.362 
In sum, Beck’s brief and oral argument before the Court in Myers was a paean to the 
theory of the unitary executive as set out in this series of articles.  One could not have asked for a 
more ringing reaffirmation of the theory than was provided by the Coolidge Administration.  At 
a few points Beck hinted at narrower grounds of decision, but he provided all of the raw material 
needed to construct a great opinion defending the constitutional basis of the removal power. 
The majority opinion in Myers was written by Chief Justice and former President 
William Taft, over the powerful dissents submitted by Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, and 
Holmes.  The consistency of previous presidents’ refusal to accept congressionally-imposed 
limits on presidential removals played a large role in Taft’s opinion.  In light of the opposition 
offered by Presidents Jackson, Grant, Cleveland, Wilson, and Coolidge, any limits on “the 
independent power of the President to remove . . . cannot be said really to have received the 
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acquiescence of the executive branch of government,”363 just as this series of articles claims.  The 
whole Myers episode is undoubtedly the Coolidge Administration’s defining moment with 
respect to the theory of the unitary executive, and it can fairly be said that the administration 
ranks up there with Andrew Jackson’s and Grover Cleveland’s as one of the staunchest defenders 
of the president’s removal power in history. 
Another major controversy of the Coolidge years came as a result of the administration’s 
need to address the burgeoning Teapot Dome scandal, which had broken out during the Harding 
Administration.  Coolidge responded by appointing two special prosecutors to try the cases that 
arose from the scandal:  one a Republican, future Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, and 
the other a Democrat, Atlee Pomerene.364  These two individuals were presidential appointees 
and fully removable by Coolidge,365 although this episode represents the only instance in history 
in which a special prosecutor was confirmed by the Senate.366 
Roberts and Pomerene ably prosecuted the scandal, with no impairment of Coolidge’s 
powers of control over the executive branch.  Because one special prosecutor was from each 
major political party, public trust in the government was restored.  The prosecution would 
eventually culminate in the conviction of Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall, who became the 
first cabinet officer ever sentenced to prison for malfeasance in office.367  Coolidge’s handling of 
the Teapot Dome scandal was thus a model of what a strong president with integrity could do to 
clean up a government scandal that had not happened on his watch.  Future presidents might do 
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well to emulate his example of two executive branch co-prosecutors, one from each major 
political party.368 
Unfortunately for Coolidge, Congress was not content to let him prosecute these cases.  It 
also wanted to become involved in the removal of the executive branch officers implicated by 
the scandal.369  Thus, the Senate debated a series of resolutions calling for the president to 
demand the resignation of Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby for his role in the Teapot Dome 
affair, which consisted solely of his decision to transfer jurisdiction over the oil reserves to Fall.  
Although several Senators objected that the Senate had no right “to require the President to 
accede to [the Senate’s demand] and dismiss the man,” the Senate adopted a resolution calling 
for Denby’s removal by a vote of forty-seven to thirty-four.370 
Coolidge rebuffed the Senate resolution, announcing that “[n]o official recognition can be 
given to the passage of the Senate resolution relative to their opinion concerning members of the 
Cabinet or other officers under executive control.”  Coolidge regarded it “as a vital principle of 
our Government” that “[t]he dismissal of an officer of the Government, . . . other than by 
impeachment, is exclusively an executive function,” supporting his argument by quoting both 
Cleveland’s statement regarding the Duskin suspension and the seminal statements offered by 
Madison in the Decision of 1789.371   This annexing of the “opinions of Presidents James 
Madison and Grover Cleveland” gave a bipartisan ring to Coolidge’s claim of a unilateral 
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presidential removal power.372  Ultimately, despite Coolidge’s support, both Denby and 
Daugherty resigned because, as Denby indicated, their continuance in the Cabinet was proving 
an embarrassment to the president.  While continuing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Senate’s resolutions, Coolidge regretfully accepted their resignations for purely prudential 
reasons, assuring Denby, “You will go with the knowledge that your honesty and integrity have 
not been impugned.”373 
Coolidge responded in a similar fashion to the Senate’s March 12, 1924, resolution 
calling for an investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  Although Coolidge 
acknowledged “[w]hatever may be necessary for the information of the Senate or any of its 
Committees in order better to enable them to perform their legislative or other constitutional 
functions ought always to be furnished willingly and expeditiously by any Department,” he 
complained that “the attack which is being made on the Treasury goes beyond any of these 
legitimate requirements” and threatened to upset the “comity between the Executive 
Departments and the Senate.”374  Coolidge emphasized: 
The Constitutional and legal rights of the Senate ought to maintained at all times.  
Also the same must be said of the Executive Departments.  But these rights ought 
not to be used as a subterfuge to cover unwarranted intrusion.  It is the duty of the 
Executive to resist such intrusion and to bring to the attention of the Senate its 
serious consequences.  That I shall do in this instance.375 
The Coolidge Administration also had to defend itself against a special Senate committee 
investigating Jess W. Smith, a confidant of Attorney General Harry Daugherty who had taken 
bribes, only to commit suicide as his transgressions began to come to light.  The committee never 
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secured any concrete evidence against Daugherty, who was acquitted in both of his trials (albeit 
in the second by a single vote).  Coolidge stood by Daugherty for a time, but became 
increasingly concerned by the mounting evidence that Daugherty was on the verge of a nervous 
breakdown.  Coolidge eventually demanded Daugherty’s resignation, and after Daugherty 
somewhat pugnaciously refused to resign, Coolidge summarily dismissed him.376  This was in 
essence a presidential removal, and it was to be the most spectacular removal of the Coolidge 
years. 
The fact the resignations of Denby and Daugherty precluded further conflict with 
Congress over control of the removal power does nothing to dissipate the significance of 
Coolidge’s opposition to Congress’s action.  Particularly when combined with his assertion of 
control over the independent regulatory agencies, his administration’s opposition to 
congressional attempts to limit the removal power clearly represents another link in the chain of 
presidential defenses of the unitary executive. 
There was another, somewhat idiosyncratic issue during the Coolidge years with respect 
to the president’s power and duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed:  the 
enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act of 1919 implementing 
Prohibition.  Ferrell reports, “Curiously, many contemporary and later Americans described 
Prohibition as the most outrageous example of government intrusion into the social lives of 
citizens, but in reality, enforcement of Prohibition was so light as to have been virtually 
nonexistent.”377  In short, “Federal enforcement [of Prohibition] was a joke.”378  In this regard, 
Coolidge was no worse than the vast majority of politicians.  Members of Coolidge’s cabinet, 
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such as Secretary of State Kellogg and Treasury Secretary Mellon, were known to drink illegally, 
and stories of violations by members of Congress were legion.379  The states, for their part, 
“behaved shamelessly,” simply “pass[ing] the task of enforcement to the federal government.”380  
Most political leaders were ambivalent about enforcement.  They had only supported Prohibition 
out of political expediency and were more than happy to abandon it if convenient.  As a result, 
they were content to follow “an exquisitely inattentive course toward enforcement, sensing that 
Prohibition would either gather support and make itself effective or lose support and go down to 
defeat.”381  Eventually, the latter would prove to be the case, eventually rendering the willingness 
or lack of willingness to enforce Prohibition moot. 
The Coolidge Administration also bore witness to the creation of another independent 
agency was created in 1927:  the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).382  The Act creating the FRC 
represented a compromise between the House, which favored a regime in which the commission 
and the Secretary of Commerce shared authority, and the Senate, which preferred vesting all of 
the regulatory responsibilities in an independent agency.  The legislation ultimately adopted gave 
the FRC the initial authority to allocate frequencies, set technical standards, and issue licenses.383  
After one year, those responsibilities were to be transferred to the Secretary of Commerce, after 
which time the FRC would turn into a part-time appellate body to review the Secretary’s 
decisions.384  The interim nature of the FRC’s authority raises serious questions as to the 
agency’s independence.  Congress extended the initial division of authority through the end of 
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the Coolidge Administration by granting a pair of one-year extensions385 and eventually gave the 
FRC permanent status during the initial year of the Hoover Administration.386  In the wake of the 
landmark decision in Myers, Congress did not even maintain the pretense of including any 
restrictions on the president’s power to remove commissioners. 
Finally, the Coolidge years saw Secretary of State Kellogg disavowing the Roosevelt 
Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine.  Ferrell reports that Kellogg stated outright that “the United 
States had no right to use the Monroe Doctrine to enforce Latin American good behavior.”387  
Kellogg “explained that under the Monroe Doctrine, the rights and interests of the United States 
were ‘against Europe and not against the Latin Americas.’  The Doctrine ‘is not a lance; it is a 
shield.’”388  The Coolidge Administration thus effected a significant change of direction in U.S. 
foreign policy.  The fact that Coolidge could superintend such a change of course attests to the 
strength of the president’s authority, not its weakness. 
In sum, the Coolidge Administration took a wide range of steps to defend the unitariness 
of the executive, most importantly by litigating and winning the great case of Myers v. United 
States.  There can be no question that an administration which litigated and won Myers did not 
acquiesce in any diminution of the unitary executive for purposes of this article. 
IX. HERBERT C. HOOVER 
Herbert Hoover reached the White House after lengthy service as Secretary of Commerce 
and Labor to Presidents Harding and Coolidge.  Although Hoover shared Coolidge’s reticence 
about interfering with the prerogatives of Congress, that reticence did not stop him from 
                                                 
385 See Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 701, 45 Stat. 1559; Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 263, 45 Stat. 373. 
386 Act of Dec. 18, 1929, ch. 7, 46 Stat. 50.  
387  FERRELL, supra note 346, at _. 
388 Id. at 142. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art11
 82
continuing his predecessors’ defense of the president’s prerogatives.  In fact, his opposition to 
infringements upon the unitariness of the executive branch began long before his inauguration.  
While a member of the Coolidge Administration, Hoover had questioned the constitutional 
propriety of conferring executive powers upon independent agencies, arguing that “there should 
be single-headed responsibility in executive and administrative functions.”389  Hoover elaborated: 
The necessarily divided minds of the best board in the world had always resulted 
in failure in executive work.  Every member must have a four-way independent 
responsibility.  He is responsible for every act of the board to the country as a 
whole, to his particular constituency, to his political party and finally to Congress.  
There is only one responsibility that he does not have and that is to the President 
of the United States, who, at least under the spirit of the Constitution, should be 
vested with all administrative authority.390 
Hoover reiterated these views after assuming the Presidency.  Addressing the problem of 
departmental reorganization in his First Annual Message, Hoover urged that all executive 
administrative activities should be placed under single-headed responsibility.  “Indeed,” Hoover 
concluded, “these are the fundamental principles upon which our Government was founded, and 
they are the principles which have been adhered to in the whole development of our business 
structure, and they are the distillation of the common sense of generations.”391  Consistent with 
these views, Hoover assumed full responsibility for all executive policies, issuing directives to 
the ICC regarding passenger rates and railroad consolidation.392  Hoover’s biographer, Martin 
Fausold, reports that Hoover asserted his authority over Andrew Mellon, the strong-willed 
Secretary of the Treasury, by ordering Mellon’s department “to publish all large governmental 
refunds of gift, estate, and income taxes[, which] was an important repudiation of the secretary’s 
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earlier policies.”393  There was no question but that Hoover was a hands-on administrator fully in 
charge of his own administration. 
Even Congress appears to have concurred in the view that presidents should be the head 
of the administrative system.  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United 
States,394 Congress deliberately omitted any removal restrictions when it replaced the original 
Federal Power Commission (FPC) with a five-member commission.395  When asked why the 
removal provisions first enacted in the Interstate Commerce Act were deleted from the bill, the 
House sponsor of the legislation replied that such a provision was unnecessary because the 
Supreme Court had already decided that the president “can remove any public official at any 
time for malfeasance in office.”396 
Hoover again defended the removal power when the Senate “reconsidered” its votes to 
confirm three nominees to the FPC because of intervening allegations of corruption.  Hoover 
denounced the Senate’s action as an attempt “to encroach upon the Executive functions by 
removal of a duly appointed executive officer under the guise of reconsideration of his 
nomination.”397  The Senate ignored Hoover’s protestations and, upon reconsideration, 
reconfirmed two of the nominees, but rejected the nomination of George Otis Smith.398  In the 
end, Hoover prevailed when the Supreme Court invalidated the Senate’s action, holding that the 
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Senate’s rules did not permit such reconsiderations.399  But even had the Court ruled otherwise, it 
would not have weakened the moment of Hoover’s opposition for the purposes of coordinate 
construction.  
Hoover did temporarily accede to Congress’s attempt to involve itself in the execution of 
the laws when he signed the Economy Act of 1932.400  This Act permitted Hoover to reorganize 
any administrative agency, including the independent regulatory commissions, by executive 
order.401  Hoover was an avid supporter of executive reorganization.  Fausold reports that while 
Hoover had trouble in handling electoral politics, “he was in his element in the world of 
administration.  The Hoover presidency would accommodate twentieth-century ideas of 
executive reorganization and the managerial presidency.”402  Hoover embraced the Progressive 
vision of expert, nonpolitical administration and he sought to make that it a reality,403 and he was 
eager to continue the work begun by Teddy Roosevelt’s Keep Commission and William Howard 
Taft’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency.404  His experience reorganizing the Commerce 
Department under Presidents Harding and Coolidge gave Hoover confidence in his ability to 
bring the same benefits to the entire executive branch.405   
However, in accordance with Hoover’s suggestions,406 the Act provided that executive 
reorganization orders were subject to a one-house legislative veto, whereby either house could 
                                                 
399 See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).  It should be emphasized that because the Court 
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402 FAUSOLD, supra note 393, at 54. 
403 Id. at 56. 
404 Id. at 54. 
405 Id. at 55. 
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overturn the order by passing a resolution within sixty days of their issuance.407  In fact, when 
Hoover submitted a series of reorganization proposals to Congress after his defeat in the 1932 
elections, the Democratically-controlled Congress vetoed every one of them, ostensibly on the 
grounds that the incoming president ought to have the latitude to effect his own reorganization.408 
Hoover’s tolerance for the legislative veto proved to be short lived.  Just before leaving 
office, Hoover vetoed a bill requiring that a Joint Committee of Congress approve all refunds in 
excess of $20,000 as an improper infringement of the president’s power to execute the laws.409  
As the opinion authored by Attorney General William D. Mitchell that Hoover attached to his 
veto message intoned, “The Constitution of the United States divides the functions of the 
Government into three great departments--the legislative, the executive, and the judicial--and 
establishes the principle that they shall be kept separate, and that neither the legislative, 
executive, nor judicial branch may exercise functions belonging to the others.”410  The legislative 
veto provision contained in this legislation, however, “violates this constitutional principle” by 
“attempt[ing] to entrust to members of the legislative branch, acting ex officio, executive 
functions in the execution of the law.”411  Anticipating the bicameralism requirement 
acknowledged in INS v. Chadha,412 Mitchell alternatively argued that that even if the approval of 
tax refunds were regarded as a legislative function, “the proviso in this bill is equally obnoxious 
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to the Constitution because a joint committee has not power to legislate, and legislative power 
can not be delegated to it.”413  Mitchell extended this reasoning to criticize the one-house 
legislative veto contained in the Economy Act of 1932, charging that “[t]he attempt to give to 
either House of Congress, by action which is not legislation, power to disapprove administrative 
acts, raises a grave question as to the validity” of that provision as well.414  Although this one 
legislative veto provision “may not be important itself,” Mitchell recognized that “the principle 
at stake [was] vital,”415 because “[t]o acquiesce in legislation having a tendency to encroach upon 
the executive authority in establishing dangerous precedents.”416  No president since Washington 
had acquiesced in such encroachments, Mitchell noted, and Hoover would not be the first.417 
Congress apparently acceded to these concerns.  When it reenacted the president’s 
reorganization authority during the closing days of the Hoover Administration, Congress again 
authorized the president to transfer or abolish any executive agency or independent agency, 
prohibiting only the complete abolishment of a department.  In so doing, it discarded the 
legislative veto provided by the 1932 Act, substituting the less restrictive requirement that the 
reorganization orders lie before Congress for sixty days before they became active.418  
In addition, Hoover faced the same issue with the faithful execution of the laws and 
Prohibition faced by his predecessors.  By 1931, it appeared there had been a complete 
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breakdown in the enforcement of Prohibition by both the federal government and the states.419  In 
stark contrast to Harding and Coolidge, Hoover met this challenge by dutifully attempting to 
enforce the law.  Fausold observes: 
The president dealt conscientiously with the issue of prohibition.  He increased 
the number of federal enforcement personnel and upgraded their qualifications.  
He transferred the federal supervision of prohibition from the Treasury to the 
Justice Department.  He implored states to assume proper concurrent enforcement 
responsibility.  Most important, however, was the president’s appointing the 
Wickersham Commission of distinguished Americans to critically consider . . . 
the more effective organization of our agencies of investigation and 
prosecution.420 
One major question is why Hoover chose to stick with support of Prohibition even when 
he knew it was not working.  Fausold reports: 
Hoover’s explanation of his commitment to prohibition, even as it failed during 
his administration, was his constitutional responsibility as president.  The great 
lawyer Elihu Root told him the president’s mere suggestion of repeal would 
undermine the enforcement of the amendment in those places where it had been 
successful.  More important, the Constitution provided no role for the president in 
the amendment process.421 
Other factors in Hoover’s retention of Prohibition were undoubtedly political 
motivations, his austere Quaker background, and the fact that prohibition for Hoover was a social 
ordering device with a noble motive that appealed to the president’s conservative temperament.422  
Thus, it was Hoover’s fate that he would only “fan the fires of the prohibition debate among 
Republicans by standing firm on the enforcement of the amendment, even when most 
Republicans and the vast majority of Americans favored its drastic revision, if not its repeal.”423  
Regardless of the political advisability of his position, there can be no doubts as to the 
faithfulness with which Hoover faithfully executed the laws on Prohibition. 
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Finally, just as the Monroe and Roosevelt Administrations invoked “the executive 
Power” to formulate U.S. foreign policy, so too did the Hoover Administration become known 
for the Stimson Doctrine, named after Hoover’s eminent Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, 
which was directed at the ongoing conflict between China and Japan.  The Doctrine announced 
that the United States would not recognize any treaty that inconsistent with any existing treaties, 
such as the Kellogg and Nine Power pacts.424  Vigorous presidential direction of foreign affairs 
represents another confirmation of Hoover’s willingness to assert his authority over the 
execution of federal law. 
In retrospect, it is clear that Hoover believed in a hierarchical administrative structure for 
the executive branch with the president at the top.  He had opposed independent agencies prior to 
becoming president, and in his actions as president he asserted control over the whole of the 
executive branch.  He appears to have prevailed in his battle with Congress over the legislative 
veto, just as he had prevailed in his conflicts with Congress over the independent agencies and 
the removal power.  Whenever Hoover was confronted with congressional attempts to intrude 
upon the unitariness of the executive branch, he offered his strong opposition.  Even with respect 
to the nation’s ill-fated experiment with Prohibition, Hoover faithfully discharged his 
constitutional duty.  Therefore, by the end of the Hoover Administration, no president had yet 
acquiesced in any encroachment upon his sole authority to execute the laws. 
X. FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 
The scope of presidential power exploded during the presidency of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.  One of the first critical issues facing FDR was how to deal with the crisis of the 
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Great Depression when he assumed office on March 4, 1933.  What followed was a burst of 
activity during the first one hundred days of FDR’s administration that was the quintessence of 
“executive energy rapidly applied.”425  Roosevelt augmented his formal legislative program with 
weekly press conferences and regular national radio addresses, which would later become known 
as fireside chats.426  Although he offered few definitive statements on the issue, his aggressive 
actions to combat the Depression left little doubt that his vision of presidential power was 
expansive.427  “The hectic pace of the Hundred Days . . . left many breathless,” but it established 
Roosevelt’s leadership and put the presidency in the spotlight where he wanted it to be.428  FDR’s 
presidency was to demonstrate “the indispensable ingredient of political leadership.”429  By 
mobilizing the country, Roosevelt greatly augmented his power and placed presidency at center 
stage in national politics. 
In the process, Roosevelt pioneered a revolutionary new vision of administration that 
rejected the vision of the Progressive movement, which idealized expert administrators who were 
insulated from politics.430  Instead, the Roosevelt envisioned a more pluralist vision of 
administration, in which “[t]he key to effective administration was less its expertise than its 
ability to connect with the public.”431  His goal is to make administration more political, rather 
than less.432  The primacy of politics over technocracy is evident in Roosevelt’s decision to 
employ a special session of Congress rather than a series of executive orders as the vehicle for 
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implementing the first hundred days, which Professor Barry Karl, a major student of 
administrative history, regards as “perhaps the most crucial decision of Roosevelt’s presidency 
and the most characteristic.”433  Leonard D. White, whose books this series of articles have relied 
upon, was another one of the administrative law scholars inspired by FDR’s radically new 
approach to problems of public administration.  Under this new vision, the ideal administrators 
are “permanent officials . . . who are able by the personal leadership to mediate between the 
technician, the politician, and the public.”434 
The administrative structure that Roosevelt used to employ his pluralist vision was 
chaotic.  Roosevelt often set up administrators in competition with one another in contrivances 
that “baffled his contemporaries and puzzled scholars, who came up with the term ‘competitive 
bureaucracy’ to describe his work.”435  FDR’s administrative systems worked well by 
encouraging subordinates to compete with one another to solve the problems Roosevelt had put 
before them.  Roosevelt was something of an administrative genius, and this pluralist approach to 
administration, coupled with his keen eye for picking able subordinates, allowed FDR to get a 
great deal done.  At the same time, the open structure of the administration allowed FDR to keep 
“the power of decision for himself.  One searches the record of Roosevelt’s presidency in vain to 
find a major issue that ‘got away’ from him.  The failures of his presidency resulted from bad 
judgment, not inattention.”436  Roosevelt’s biographer, George McJimsey, reports, “Even by the 
end of his second term, there had developed a kind of celebration of executive leadership and 
government by administration” such that “[b]ureaucracy seemed the wave of the future” and the 
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task of the president “was to employ pluralistic methods to make bureaucracy the instrument of 
democracy.”437  In the end, however, Roosevelt was never to “create a political-administrative 
structure that would securely and predictably achieve his vision.”438  FDR’s administrative style 
remained susceptible to all of the classic vulnerabilities and complexities of pluralism.  
Mobilizing citizen constituencies often simply provided them with the opportunity to redirect 
government resources toward their own purposes.439  FDR might receive low marks for rational 
management and political maneuvering in administration, but he kept a steady flow of 
information and options that allowed him always to reserve the power of decision for himself.440 
Roosevelt wasted little time in centralizing his control over the execution of the laws.  
During the opening months of his administration, Roosevelt issued an executive order 
transferring all of the government’s legal authority to the Justice Department.441  As we will 
subsequently discuss at some length,442 Roosevelt also transferred the Bureau of the Budget from 
the Treasury Department to the newly created Executive Office of the President so that it could 
become the president’s principal means for asserting his control over the entire executive branch.  
Accordingly, Roosevelt directed the Bureau to keep him informed about the various agencies’ 
activities, to advise the agencies on administrative organization and practice, and to review 
agencies’ substantive policy proposals and congressional testimony.443  These moves were of 
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monumental importance in increasing presidential control over the administration of the law.  
Both the Bureau of the Budget and the Justice Department were to become key agencies by 
which the president controlled the executive branch. 
Roosevelt also issued a series of Executive Orders banning racial discrimination in 
government procurement.  As Frank Cross has observed, in so doing Roosevelt “issued a direct 
order to members of the executive branch regarding their administration of federal law.”444  The 
initial order, which required that a specific nondiscrimination provision be included in all 
defense contracts, was somewhat vague as to its legal basis, citing “the authority vested in [the 
President] by the Constitution and the statutes.”445  Although a later order allowing this provision 
to be incorporated by reference relied on other grounds,446 Roosevelt’s third and final 
nondiscrimination order, which extended the requirement to all government contracts, again 
invoked his authority under “the authority vested in [the President] by the Constitution and the 
statutes,” as well his power as Commander-in-Chief.447  As one commentator has noted, “[e]ven 
the most adventuresome commentators have been unable to unearth the statutes upon which 
President Roosevelt claimed to have based his antidiscrimination orders.”448  It thus seems clear 
that Roosevelt based these executive orders on the constitutional authority conferred upon him 
by Article II.449 
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Roosevelt also rebuffed congressional attempts to interfere directly with the execution of 
the laws.  On May 19, 1937, Congress passed a joint resolution to establish a commission to 
control the United States’ participation in the 1939 New York World’s Fair because it was 
composed of six Members of Congress and three Cabinet members.  Roosevelt vetoed the 
legislation, citing an Attorney General opinion concluding that permitting a commission 
composed largely of members of Congress to appoint executive staff and to administer public 
expenditures constituted “‘an unconstitutional invasion of the province of the executive.’”450  
Four years later, Roosevelt reacted strongly when the House Un-American Activities 
Committee attempted to force the President to remove three “crackpot, radical bureaucrats” it 
believed were unfit for continued government employment451 when it attached a rider to the 
Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act prohibiting the use of federal funds to pay their salaries.452  
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Given the importance of the supplemental appropriations provided under the bill, Roosevelt had 
little choice but to sign the bill.  Roosevelt nonetheless registered his objections in a signing 
statement condemning the rider as “not only unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.”453  
Since “[t]his rider is an unwarranted encroachment upon the authority of both the executive and 
judicial branches,” Roosevelt concluded that “[i]t is not, in my judgment binding upon them.”454  
Not wanting to dignify Congress’s intrusion upon his removal power any further, Roosevelt 
declined to submit these officials’ names for confirmation as suggested by the rider.  The 
disbursing officers stopped paying them, however, and within six months, all three had left 
government service.455  Moreover, when the three affected officials brought an action in the 
Court of Claims complaining, among other things, that the rider “attempts to effect legislative 
removal of plaintiff, and is therefore an unconstitutional encroachment on executive power,”456 
Attorney General Biddle declined to defend the constitutionality of the statute, and Congress was 
forced to employ special counsel to argue its position.457  The Court of Claims sided with the 
officials, resolving the case on nonconstitutional grounds458  The suit would not ultimately be 
resolved until the Truman Administration, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in United 
States v. Lovett.459  The prolonged nature of the proceedings should not obscure the fact that the 
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Roosevelt Administration strongly defended the president’s power to remove throughout the 
litigation.460  
Roosevelt also asserted his control over the independent agencies as well as the executive 
departments.  Despite the fact that the Water Power Act clearly provided that after the President 
designated the first Chairman of the FPC, the Commission would select its own chairman, 
Roosevelt successfully pressured George Otis Smith into resigning and designated Frank R. 
McNinch as his successor in order to make the FPC fully responsive to his policies.461  Roosevelt 
further dominated the FPC when he instructed it to cooperate with other branches the executive 
department.462  Moreover, just as Congress did not include any restrictions on the presidential 
removals when it created the FPC in 1927, it also failed to include any such restrictions when it 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission463 and the Federal Communications 
Commission.464  Apparently, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers, 
Congress did not believe that such restrictions were worth the effort. 
Franklin Roosevelt’s most important assertion of control over an independent agency 
came with his attempted removal of the by-now notorious, right-wing FTC Chairman, William 
E. Humphrey.  Humphrey refused several requests from Roosevelt that he resign.  As FDR said 
in the final such request, “You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my 
mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade 
Commission, and frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have a full 
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confidence.”465  When Humphrey still refused Roosevelt’s request that he resign, FDR finally 
informed him on October 7, 1933, that “[e]ffective as of this date you are hereby removed from 
the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.”466  Roosevelt’s summary removal 
of Humphrey made clear that the Roosevelt Administration had no doubts as to the president’s 
power to remove any official exercising executive authority.  Evidently, Congress agreed, 
offering not a single word of protest to Roosevelt’s actions, and the Senate confirmed 
Humphrey’s replacement without incident.467 
The reactionary Humphrey was not to go quietly, however.  Humphrey sued for his 
salary, and his law suit was litigated after his death by his executor, Samuel F. Rathbun, all the 
way up to the Supreme Court.  The Roosevelt Administration briefed and argued Humphrey’s 
Executor, taking a very strong pro-unitary executive line.  Relying heavily the Supreme Court’s 
sweeping opinion in Myers, the Roosevelt Administration’s Supreme Court brief argued that the 
restrictions on the removal power in the FTC Act constituted “a substantial interference with the 
constitutional duty of the President to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”468 
The administration reinforced its basic points in its oral arguments.  First, the 
administration argued the case was directly controlled by Shurtleff v. United States.  The 
administration noted that the removal provisions of the FTC Act were identical to the removal 
provisions held in Shurtleff not to impose any restrictions on the president’s power to remove.  
The cases were claimed to be almost exactly alike.469 
                                                 
465 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Humphrey (Aug. 31, 1933), reprinted in 
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 619. 
466 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to William Humphrey (Oct. 7, 1933), reprinted in Humphrey’s 
Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 619. 
467 See CUSHMAN, supra note 178, at 226, 682; DOYLE, supra note 322, at 18 
468 Brief for the United States at 23, Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (No. 
667). 
469 295 U.S. at _ (argument of Solicitor General Reed). 
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The administration bolstered its argument by noting that in 1908, five years after Shurtleff 
was decided, Congress had amended the statute at issue in Shurtleff so that it would clearly state 
that general appraisers could be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office and no other cause.”470  Congress had extended similar protection to six other minor 
offices.471  These amendments provided the clear statement that Shurtleff held necessary before a 
statute would be construed as limiting the removal power.  The failure to include the words “and 
no other cause” in the FTC Act meant that under Shurtleff, the FTC Act should not be construed 
as interfering with the president’s generalized power of removal.  The administration relied here 
upon the following statement of Chief Justice Taft in Myers: 
Since the provision for an Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887, many 
administrative boards have been created whose members are appointed by the 
president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and in the statutes 
creating them have been provisions for the removal of the members for specified 
causes.  Such provisions are claimed to be inconsistent with the independent 
power of removal by the President.  This, however, is shown to be unfounded by 
the case of Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903). . . . This is an 
indication that many of the statutes cited are to be reconciled to the unrestricted 
power of the President to remove, if he chooses to exercise his power.472 
The administration was thus on strong ground in contending that, under the construction given in 
Shurtleff to statutory language identical to that contained in the FTC Act, Federal Trade 
Commissioners could be removed at will.473 
The administration’s second argument in its brief and oral argument was that if the FTC 
Act were read as restricting Roosevelt’s authority to dismiss Humphrey, then the Act was 
                                                 
470 Id. at 612. 
471 Id. at _ (noting Congress’s attempt to give statutory removal protection to members of the 
Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation, the Board of Tax Appeals, the Railroad Labor Board, the United 
States Coal Commission, the Board of Mediation, and the National Mediation Board). 
472 272 U.S. at 171-72. 
473 Brief of the United States in Humphrey’s Executor; Argument of Solicitor General Reed in 
Humphrey’s Executor, reprinted in 295 U.S. 612-618. 
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unconstitutional under Myers v. United States.  This was a relatively straight forward application 
of Myers, a mere nine years after that great case had been decided. 
Astonishingly, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously against the Roosevelt 
Administration in a fourteen-page opinion that confined Myers to purely executive agencies, of 
which the Court said the FTC was not one.474  Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, 
distinguished Shurtleff by noting that the statute at issue in that case did not provide for a specific 
term of years for general appraisers.  The Court’s decision holding that general appraisers were 
removable at will was thus driven by the fear that had the Court decided otherwise, general 
appraisers would enjoy what amounted to life tenure.  Such concerns would not arise, however, 
with respect to the FTC Act, which combined a provision stating that an official could only be 
removed for cause with a provision limiting that official’s term of office to a specified term of 
years.  When that was the case, the Court deemed it more appropriate to presume that the 
relevant officials were entitled to hold their offices for the entire statutory term unless they were 
removed for cause.475   
This limitation of Shurtleff seems highly suspect.  It is especially strained as an 
interpretation of congressional intent underlying FTC Act, since when that act was enacted in 
1914, the 1903 decision in Shurtleff suggested that the mere presence alone of for-cause removal 
provisions did not deprive the president of his general power to remove at will. 
The second part of Humphrey’s Executor, distinguishing Myers v. United States, was 
even more remarkable.  Here the Court distinguished Myers as applying only to purely executive 
branch offices life that of a first-class postmaster.  The FTC, according to Justice Sutherland, was 
not a purely executive entity, because it also exercised quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
                                                 
474 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).   
475 Id. at _. 
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functions.  Such entities could be insulated according to the Court from presidential exercises of 
the removal power, and the Court promised in future cases to explain which entities were purely 
executive and governed by Myers and which were quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial and 
governed by Humphrey’s Executor.476 
All in all, Humphrey’s Executor was a shocking and poorly reasoned repudiation of the 
decision nine years earlier in Myers and thirty-two years earlier in Shurtleff.  It seems 
inconceivable that either the Myers or Shurtleff Courts would have decided Humphrey’s 
Executor the same way.  Humphrey’s Executor seems clearly wrong as a matter of statutory 
interpretation and as a matter of constitutional law.  The most likely explanation is that 
                                                 
476 Id. at _.  Interestingly, the author of Humphrey’s Executor apparently did not believe that it 
definitively resolved the constitutionality of the independent agencies.  No friend of the independent regulatory 
commissions, Justice Sutherland had previously opposed the independence of the FTC on constitutional grounds 
while a Senator, joined in the majority in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and authored the formalist 
opinion in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).  Justice Sutherland added to the confusion during the 
oral argument in Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1936), a subsequent case involving the U.S. 
Shipping Board.  As Robert Cushman reports: 
 
Mr. James W. Ryan . . . was urging upon the Court the argument . . . that the United 
States Shipping Board could not constitutionally be put by executive order or by act of Congress 
in the executive branch.  The Shipping Board, he argued was not an “executive” agency and could 
not be an “executive” agency because it was not in the executive branch of the government. 
Justice Sutherland, who had been sitting back in his chair . . . leaned forward quickly 
when he heard this. 
“Did you say that the Shipping Board was not in the executive branch of the 
government?”  He spoke as though he did not believe he had heard correctly, and several other 
Justices smiled condescendingly at counsel as though he were making a farfetched proposal. 
“Yes, your Honor,” Mr. Ryan replied. 
“What makes you think that?  Where do you find any legal basis for such a conclusion?” 
the Justice wished to know. 
“Why, in your Honor’s opinion in the Humphrey case, this Court held that the Federal 
Trade Commission and similar regulatory agencies were not in the executive branch of the 
government.  The Shipping Board fell within the same general category as the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission.”  Mr. Ryan then proceeded to read certain 
portions of that opinion. 
“What branch of the Government do you think the Shipping Board was in, if it was not in 
the executive branch?” the Justice wanted to know. 
“In the legislative branch, your Honor.” 
Justice Sutherland shook his head, as though he disagreed, and seemed to be thinking the 
question over as the discussion went on to other points. 
 
CUSHMAN, supra note 178, at 445-48 (emphasis in original). 
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Humphrey’s Executor represents another example of the hostility towards the Roosevelt 
Administration exhibited by many Supreme Court decisions of that period.   
Naturally, Congress’s interest in imposing removal restrictions revived after Humphrey’s 
Executor.  After the announcement of that decision, Congress subsequently included removal 
restrictions in the legislation establishing the National Labor Relations Board,477 the U.S. 
Maritime Commission,478 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.479  In addition, the legislation that 
removed the Treasury Secretary and the Comptroller of the Currency from the Federal Reserve 
Board imposed removal restrictions on the Federal Reserve Board for the first time.480  The 
enactment histories of these bills underscore the importance of the Supreme Court’s decision.  
The initial version of the National Labor Relations Act did not include any removal restrictions, 
and Congress ignored the issue until after the issuance of the opinion in Humphrey’s Executor.481  
The Senate specifically postponed consideration of a proposal to restore the removal restrictions 
to the Federal Reserve Board pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue.  In return for 
the loss of presidential control represented by these changes, the president gained right to 
designate the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board as well as the power to remove him from 
the Governorship at pleasure.482  The debates regarding the Civil Aeronautics Board are perhaps 
the most revealing.  A number of legislators, including future President Harry S. Truman, 
objected that executive duties could not be given to a body that was independent of presidential 
                                                 
477 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (giving members five-year 
terms subject to removal for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause”). 
478 Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 1985, 1985 (giving members six-year 
terms subject to removal for “neglect of duty or malfeasance”). 
479 Civil Aeronautics Authority Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 201, 52 Stat. 973, 981 (giving members six-
year terms subject to removal for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office). 
480 Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 203(b), 49 Stat. 684, 704 (giving board members fourteen-year 
terms “unless sooner removed for cause by the President”).   
481 CUSHMAN, supra note 178, at 363, 366.   
482 Id. at 169, 174-76.   
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direction.483  Although their efforts were initially unsuccessful, they eventually prevailed when 
Roosevelt used his reorganization power to consolidate the Civil Aeronautics Board back into 
Commerce Department.484   
FDR regarded his defeat in Humphrey’s Executor as a personal affront.  Even more 
importantly, it threatened his ability to coordinate the execution of the law.485  His subsequent 
conduct reveals that the decision did not alter his belief in the president’s power to remove 
independent regulatory commissioners.  In March of 1938, despite the belief of many in 
Congress that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Act shielded Board members from presidential 
removal,486 Roosevelt removed Dr. Arthur E. Morgan as TVA Chairman after Morgan questioned 
the integrity of his fellow board members and insisted that he was answerable only to Congress.  
Although Roosevelt conceded that “[o]bviously the Congress has full power of investigation,” 
Morgan’s claim that he was not answerable to the president contradicted the provision of “the 
Constitution of the United States declar[ing] that ‘the executive power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States.’”487  Roosevelt also relied on the Take Care Clause, contending: 
It would violate my constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed if I should leave unsupported charges hanging indefinitely over the 
heads of two officials who have cooperated in the difficult task of divided 
authority and thereby permit a recalcitrant non-cooperative officials further 
freedom to sabotage Government operations at a crucial time.488 
                                                 
483 See id. at 409-15. 
484 Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1940, 3 C.F.R. 1301, 1302-03 (1938-1943 compilation). 
485 See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 78-81 (1995); REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT 392 
& n.6 (1957). 
486 See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC. 4196 (1938) (statement of Sen. Johnson of California); see also Edward 
S. Corwin, The President as Administrative Chief, 1 J. POL. 17 (1939), reprinted in PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 72, 107 (Richard Loss ed., 1976). 
487 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of the Removal of the 
Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 450, at 162-63. 
488 Id.; see also id. at 151-52 (“I cannot . . . abdicate my constitutional duty to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.”); id. at 153 (“Under the Constitution of the United States, the Chief Executive is directly 
charged to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”); id. at 156 (“As Chief Executive constitutionally 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art11
 102
Roosevelt also drew support from an Attorney General opinion concluding that Morgan could be 
removed under Myers and Humphrey’s Executor because TVA was neither quasi-legislative nor 
quasi-judicial and because the TVA Act did not disclose any congressional intent to restrict the 
removal of TVA board members.489  Therefore, Roosevelt consistently asserted his constitutional 
authority to control the independent agencies and remove their members even in the face of 
judicial authority to the contrary.  This time, however, the courts would uphold Roosevelt’s 
actions.490   
The Roosevelt Administration also bore witness to the enactment of the Veterans’ 
Preference Act of 1944,491 which provided veterans with preferred access to federal employment.  
It also provided for expanded procedural safeguards with respect to removal, requiring that 
removals be made in writing with a chance for employee reply and giving veterans the right to 
appeal adverse actions to the Civil Service Commission.492  Although some have suggested that 
the Act provided the impetus for more searching judicial scrutiny of the substance of the removal 
decision,493 such a conclusion is belied by the fact that the Act employed the same standard for 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsible for the faithful execution of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, I could not ignore charges of 
dishonesty, bad faith and conspiracy in administration.”). 
489 Id. at 151 (citing 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 145 (1938)).  See generally FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICTS, supra note 260, at 67-69; 2 HAYNES, supra note 237, at 833-35; Fisher, supra note 291, at 67. 
490 The courts upheld Roosevelt’s removal of Morgan on the grounds that the TVA Act did not limit 
removals of Board members to specified causes.  Morgan v. TVA, 28 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d, 115 
F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).  The TVA Act provided that any Board member “found 
by the President of the United States” to have applied a “political test or qualification” or otherwise have made 
“appointments and promotions . . . on the basis” of any other criteria except “merit and efficiency” “shall be 
removed from office by the President of the United States.”  Tennessee Valley Authority Act, ch. 32, § 6, 48 Stat. 
58, 63 (1933) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831e).  The courts held that this language did not indicate with sufficient 
clarity that Congress intended to limit the President’s power of removal to that specified cause.  28 F. Supp. at 736-
37 (citing Shurtleff)); 115 F.2d at 992-93 (same).  Subsequent judicial and executive authority has reaffirmed this 
holding.  See TVA v. Kizer, 142 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1944); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President 
Upon Signing a Bill Amending the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (Aug. 6, 1959), in 1959 PUB. PAPERS 566; 11 
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 90 (1987). 
491 ch. 359, 58 Stat. 387. 
492 § 14, 58 Stat. at 390-91. 
493 See Frug, supra note 103, at 976, 982; Kathleen V. Buffon, Comment, Removal for Cause from 
the Civil Service;  The Problem of Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 224 (1979). 
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dismissal as the Lloyd-Lafollette Act, which was previously recognized as not limiting the 
substantive removal power.494  The legislative history of the Veterans’ Preference Act shed no 
additional light on how this language should be construed and gave no indication that Congress 
intended to adopt a different standard.495  As a result, after the enactment of the Veterans’ 
Preference Act, courts continued to limit their review to procedural compliance and decline to 
review the underlying substance.496  Courts subsequently held that insubordination represented 
sufficient cause under the Veterans’ Preference Act to justify removal.497  Since the freedom to 
discharge officers who fail to carry out the president’s instructions is the very essence of the 
removal power,498 the Veterans’ Preference Act appears to be completely consistent with the 
unitary executive.  These considerations suggest that the additional protections provided by the 
Act were driven by a desire to help returning veterans reintegrate into society rather than a desire 
to limit executive discretion over removals.499 
Finally, Roosevelt intermittently resisted Congress’s attempt to encroach upon the 
president’s executive authority through the use of the legislative veto.  At various points during 
his tenure, Roosevelt signed legislation containing legislative vetoes without entering any 
objections to the practice.500  However, when facing the legislative veto provision in the Lend 
                                                 
494 See supra note – and accompanying text. 
495  See Merrill, supra note 241, at 236; Vaskov, supra note 241, at 459. 
496 See Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 470, 471 (D.D.C. 1947); Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 
222, 223 (1946).  More searching review would not begin until Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126 (Ct. Cl. 
1948).  See Vaskov, supra note 241, at 445-47. 
497 See DeBusk v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 790 (1950).  See generally Annotation, What Is a “Cause 
as Will Promote the Efficiency of the Service,” as a Basis, under 5 U.S.C. § 7512, of Adverse Action Against a 
Preference Eligible Government Employee or His Disbarment for Future Appointment, 25 A.L.R. FED. 443, 464-65 
(DATE) (collecting cases holding insubordination sufficient cause for removal). 
498 David P. Currie, President Harrison and the Hatch Act, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 7, 10 n.24 (2002). 
499 See Frug, supra note 103, at 959. 
500 For example, Roosevelt signed legislation the legislation that would eventually provide the basis 
for the decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), subjecting the Attorney General’s decisions to suspend 
deportation proceedings to a legislative veto.  Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672; see 
also Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers:  Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 57. 80 (1990); Louis 
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Lease Act,501 Roosevelt entered his constitutional objections in an unpublished legal opinion 
entrusted to the care of Attorney General (and future Supreme Court Justice) Robert H. 
Jackson.502  Roosevelt offered a more public protest when confronted with legislation requiring 
that all naval real estate acquisitions be submitted to the Naval Affairs Committees for 
approval.503  FDR warned that permitting such committee vetoes would “disregard principles 
basic to our form of government.”504  Although Roosevelt signed the bill, in his view, “[e]fficient 
and economical administration can be achieved only by vesting authority to carry out the laws in 
an independent executive and not in legislative committees.  This act, in my opinion impinges 
deeply upon this fundamental principle of good government embodied in the Constitution.”505  
Thus, while Roosevelt’s opposition to the legislative veto was not absolute, when viewed 
in light of his centralization of control over the executive branch, his drive to dominate the 
independent agencies, his defenses of the removal power, and his veto of the 1937 New York 
World’s Fair Commission, it becomes clear that Roosevelt offered strong enough resistance to 
Congress’s attempts to invade the proper province of the presidency to foreclose any inference of 
acquiescence.  At times, such as in signing the Lend Lease Act discussed above and in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fisher, The Legislative Veto:  Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1993, at 273, 282 [hereinafter 
Fisher, Legislative Veto]; Ginnane, supra note 288, at 582-83. 
501 Ch. 11, § 3(c), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941). 
502 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Apr. 7, 1941), reprinted in Robert 
H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1357-59 (1953) (objecting to the legislative veto 
as a violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7); see also FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 408, at 125, 134-35; Fisher, 
Legislative Veto, supra note 500, at 281-82; Watson, supra note 417, at 1015-16.  Roosevelt’s rejection of the 
legislative veto represents a particularly strong defense of the unitary executive in that in issuing this opinion he 
apparently overruled the position taken by his Attorney General.  See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing 
Function:  The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 348 (1993) (citing DOUGLAS W. 
KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER:  INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 53-57 (1992)); Nelson 
Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17, 28 n.24; Nelson Lund, Rational Choice 
at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 449 n.23 (1993). 
503 Act of Jan. 28, 1944, ch. 5, § 1, 58 Stat. 7, 8; Act of Apr. 4, 1944, ch. 165, § 1, 58 Stat. 189, 190; 
see also Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 500, at 282; Ginnane, supra note 288, at 602-03. 
504 See 90 CONG. REC. 6154 (1944) (quoting N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1944), cited in Watson, supra note 
417, at 1018-19. 
505 Id.  For a discussion of Roosevelt’s eventual assent to the use of a legislative veto in the 
Reorganization Act of 1939, see infra note 581 and accompanying text. 
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debates surrounding the Reorganization Act of 1939 discussed below, political necessity forced 
Roosevelt to blunt the force of his constitutional objections.  Nonetheless, such practical 
concessions do not properly form the basis for inferring presidential capitulation to deviations 
from the unitary executive for the purposes of coordinate construction. 
Equally important is the manner in which Roosevelt transformed the presidency as an 
institution.  FDR was the quintessential activist president, and the American people were forever 
after to view of the presidency in a different light.  Although later presidents would expand 
presidential authority still further, as McJimsey notes, “Roosevelt started the momentum.”506  
Indeed, his views on presidential power became even more expansive following the onset of 
World War II.  Roosevelt followed Lincoln’s example and adopted a prerogative theory of the 
Presidency in which the President could act without specific authorizing legislation during times 
of emergency.507   
XI. THE BROWNLOW COMMITTEE AND THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1939 
The event during the Roosevelt Administration with the greatest significance for the 
unitary executive was the debate over the Brownlow Committee’s proposal to reorganize the 
executive branch, which, as Elena Kagan has pointed out, “established the infrastructure 
underlying all subsequent attempts by the White House to supervise administrative policy.”508  
When Roosevelt announced his intention to reorganize the executive branch in January of 1937, 
few expected that he would face significant opposition.  Politically, Roosevelt seemed almost 
invincible.  His recent electoral college landslide appeared to be a ringing endorsement of both 
                                                 
506 MCJIMSEY, supra note 425,. at 296. 
507 Franklin D. Roosevelt, [Message to Congress] (_ _, 1942), in 11 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 
450, at _; see also Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498, supra note 176, at 491. 
508 Kagan, supra note 29, at 2275. 
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his leadership and his New Deal policies.509  By 1937, the need for executive reorganization was 
also apparent.  The explosion of agencies spawned by the New Deal, driven in large part by 
Roosevelt’s own improvisational style of management, had made an already unwieldy executive 
branch virtually unmanageable.510  
Despite his desire to make broader use of his reorganization authority under the 1933 Act 
during his first term, concerns about the economy made it impossible for him to focus his 
attention on the task.  Consequently, Roosevelt was only able to use the power sparingly before it 
expired on March 3, 1935, submitting only twenty-seven reorganization orders consolidating a 
number of agencies.511  This relative inattention did not reflect lack of interest.  Roosevelt feared 
that the bureaucrats were combining with key members of Congress to pursue their own 
ambitions by catering to special interest groups to the detriment of national policy.512 
In order to address these concerns, Roosevelt created a Committee on Administrative 
Management, commonly known as the Brownlow Committee, to develop a new proposal to 
reorganize the executive branch,513 while also encouraging both Houses of Congress to establish 
Select Committees on Government.514  Consisting of “distinguished political scientists and public 
                                                 
509 See KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR:  INTO THE STORM, 1937-1940, at 3, 33, 213 (1993); KARL, supra 
note 294, at 247-49; KARL, supra note 433, at 132-33, 156; WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 
AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, at 195-96 (1963); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal State and the Anti-Bureaucratic 
Tradition, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY 77, 87-88 (Robert Eden ed., 1989); Barry D. Karl, Constitution and 
Central Planning:  The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 186; Karl, supra note 294, at 26. 
510 S. REP. NO. 1236, supra note 293, at 4-6; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 19-20; FISHER, supra note 
306, at 156; KARL, supra note 294, at 182-83; Karl, supra note 294, at 10. 
511 S. REP. NO. 1236, supra note 293, at 7; FISHER, supra note 306, at 131. 
512 DAVIS, supra note 509, at 20; KARL, supra note 294, at 195-99; see also Karl, supra note 294, at 
30, 32. 
513 Franklin D. Roosevelt, White House Statement on the Appointment of a Committee to Formulate 
a Plan for the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Mar. 22, 1936), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF 
FDR, supra note 450, at 144; see also 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 260, at 1496-99; KARL, supra note 294, at 204-09; 
T.H. WATKINS, RIGHTEOUS PILGRIM 556 (1990); Karl, supra note 509, at 182-83.  
514 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Letters to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House in Reference to 
the Foregoing Plan (Mar. 22, 1936), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 450 at 145; see also MORGAN, supra note 
294, at 185. 
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administrators,”515 the Brownlow Committee commenced its work in 1936.  After nearly a year 
of intensive analysis and the active input of Roosevelt,516 the Brownlow Committee issued its 
recommendations on January 8, 1937.517  
Laying out a vision aptly described as “Jacksonian,”518 the Report, in the words of one 
commentator, sounded “a clarion call for exclusive presidential control of government 
reorganization.”519  As the Report observed 
It was . . . not by accident but by deliberate design that the founding fathers set the 
American Executive in the Constitution on a solid foundation.  Sad experience 
under the Articles of Confederation, with an almost headless Government and 
committee management, had brought the American Republic to the edge of 
ruin. . . .  Consequently, there was grim purpose in resolutely providing for a 
Presidency which was to be a national office.  The President is indeed the one and 
only national officer representative of the entire nation.  There was hesitation on 
the part of some timid souls in providing the President with [the powers 
enumerated in the Constitution]. . . .  But this reluctance was overcome in the face 
of need and a democratic executive established.520 
Only by adhering to this vision of “a responsible and effective chief executive as the 
center of energy, direction, and administrative management” could the benefits of a strong and 
                                                 
515 MCJIMSEY, supra note 425, at 172. 
516 DAVIS, supra note 509, at 27; KARL, supra note 294, at 206-12, 244-46; Karl, supra note 509, at 
184. 
517 PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW REPORT]. 
518 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 111 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 1984); see also Corwin, 
supra note 486, at 89; John A. Rohr, Constitutional Legitimacy and the Administrative State:  A Reading of the 
Brownlow Commission Report, in THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY, supra note 509, at 93, 97.  It is interesting to 
note that a contemporary pamphleteer compared Roosevelt and Jackson and found them to be largely similar.  See 
CASIMIR W. RUSKOWSKI, IS ROOSEVELT AN ANDREW JACKSON? (1939). 
519 Rohr, supra note 518, at 94.  
520 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 517, at 1 (emphasis added).  The Report elaborated: 
 
As an instrument for carrying the judgment and will of the people of a nation, the American 
Executive occupies an enviable position among the executives of the states of the world, 
combining as it does the elements of popular control and the means for vigorous action and 
leadership--uniting stability and flexibility.  The American Executive as an institution stands 
across the path of those who mistakenly assert that democracy must fail because it can neither 
decide promptly nor act vigorously. 
 
Id. at 2.  So constituted, the Brownlow Committee stated, “the American Executive must be regarded as one of the 
very greatest contributions made by our Nation to the development of modern democracy.”  Id. 
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vigorous president be preserved.521  As McJimsey notes, “The plan was designed for a ‘strong’ 
president who could master political situations but would need strong management tools to 
follow through.”522 
Four of the Report’s various recommendations had particularly strong implications for 
the unitariness of the executive branch.  First, the Report recommended that the White House 
staff and the Bureau of the Budget be expanded so that they may provide better coordination of 
the execution of the laws.523  In particular, the Report envisioned that the Bureau of the Budget 
could serve as a central clearing house for all administrative policies, departmental regulations, 
and legislative proposals.524 
Second, the Report recommended that the independent agencies be integrated into the 
executive departments.  The independent agencies, the Report concluded, were inconsistent with 
the principle of the separation of powers.  In particular, the Article II Vesting Clause, in 
conjunction with the Take Care Clause and the other sections of the Constitution, “places in the 
President, and in the President alone, the whole executive power of the Government of the 
United States.”525  Consistent with this vision, the early practice was to place all executive 
officials in departments, all of which were “directly under the President in accordance with the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers.”526  Independent agencies, however, possessed 
wide power to execute the laws without being subject to executive or even legislative 
supervision, effectively impairing “the responsibility of the President for ‘the executive 
                                                 
521 Id. at 2.  In fact, the Brownlow Committee defined its purpose as investigating and reporting on 
“the organization of the duties imposed upon the President in exercising the executive power vested in him by the 
Constitution of the United States” so that the President could better fulfill his role as “Chief Executive and 
administrator within the Federal system and service.”  Id. 
522 MCJIMSEY, supra note 425, at 182. 
523 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 517, at 5-6, 16-20. 
524 Id. at 19. 
525 Id. at 29. 
526 Id.  
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Power.’”527  As such, they had become “a headless ‘fourth branch’ of government, a haphazard 
deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers” that did “violence to the basic 
theory or the American Constitution that there should be three major branches of the 
Government.”528  
The problems posed by the independent agencies were more than just theoretical:  “Not 
only by constitutional theory, but by the steady and mounting insistence of public opinion, the 
President is held responsible for the wise and efficient management of the Executive Branch of 
the Government.  The people look to him for leadership.”529   However, independent agencies 
were increasingly “vested with duties of administration and policy determination with respect to 
which they ought to be clearly and effectively responsible to the President.”530  Therefore, the 
                                                 
527 Id. The Report further complained that independent agencies 
 
leave the President with responsibility without power.  Placed by the Constitution at the head of a 
unified and centralized Executive Branch, and charged with the duty to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed, he must detour around powerful administrative agencies which are in no way 
subject to his authority and which are, therefore, both actual and potential obstructions to his 
effective over-all management of national administration. 
 
Id. at 36.  
528 Id. at 36; see also id. at 29, 46 (also referring to independent agencies as a “headless ‘fourth 
branch’ of government”).  The Report continued: 
 
The multiplication of these [independent regulatory] agencies cannot fail to obstruct the effective 
over-all management of the Executive Branch of the Government . . .  Every bit of executive and 
administrative authority which [independent regulatory agencies] enjoy means a relative 
weakening of the President, in whom, according to the Constitution, “the executive Power shall be 
vested.”  As they grow in number his stature is bound to diminish.  He will no longer in reality the 
Executive, but only one of many executives, threading his way around obstacles which he has no 
power to overcome. 
 
Id. at 37. 
529 Id. at 36.   
530 Id.  The Report elaborated: 
We speak of the “independent” regulatory commissions.  It would be more accurate to call them 
the “irresponsible” regulatory commissions, for they are areas of unaccountability.  Power without 
responsibility has no place in a government based on the theory of democratic control, for 
responsibility is the people’s only weapon, their only insurance against abuse of power. 
 
Id. 
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Report concluded, the government should return to the department-based organization of 1789 
by incorporating all of the various independent agencies into an executive department.531 
Third, reiterating the concerns that led Wilson to veto the original Budget and 
Accounting Act, the Report condemned the combination of legislative and executive functions in 
the Comptroller General.  The Committee acknowledged that “[t]o establish strict accountability 
of the Executive Branch for the faithful execution of the laws enacted by the Congress, there 
must be an independent audit of financial transactions by an independent officer reporting 
directly to the Congress who does not exercise any executive authority.”532  Separation of powers 
principles nonetheless required a clear segregation of legislative and executive responsibilities: 
The general theory underlying the Constitution is that the Congress shall be 
responsible for the determination and approval of the fiscal policies of the Nation 
and that the Executive shall be responsible for their faithful execution. . . .  The 
Congress, as representative of the people, enacts the laws; the duty of executing 
them is placed by the Constitution on the President.533 
The Comptroller General, however, was “inconsistent with Executive responsibility and 
efficient administration,” because many of the Comptroller General’s duties, such as the 
mechanics of spending appropriated money, the responsibility of making sure all expenditures 
are made in compliance with the applicable laws, the settlement of accounts, and the 
establishment of federal accounting systems, were quintessentially executive duties that should 
                                                 
531 Id. at 31-38, 41-42.  See generally CORWIN, supra note 518, at 111; 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 260, 
at 1522-23; KARL, supra note 294, at 229, 237-42; WATKINS, supra note 513, at 556; Corwin, supra note 486, at 96; 
Karl, supra note 509, at 184-85; Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency 
Decisionmakers;  The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 627, 698 (1989).  Professor Karl has called this the most important recommendation of the Report.  
KARL, supra note 433, at 157. 
532 BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 517, at 15.  As the Report further recognized, “the trust residing 
in the Congress does not end with the enactment of appropriation measures; its responsibility requires also that it 
possess suitable means with which to hold the Executive accountable for the faithful and effective execution of 
revenue and appropriation laws.”  Id. 
533 Id. at 15.  In support of this conclusion, the Report quoted President Wilson’s May 13, 1920, veto 
message objecting to a previous congressional attempt to control federal expenditures after enactment of the relevant 
appropriations act.  Id. (citing Wilson, supra note 286). 
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be exercised by an officer answerable to the president.534  When the Comptroller General 
exercises his executive authority to control expenditures, settle accounts and claims, and 
prescribe administrative accounting systems outside of presidential direction, “he is improperly 
removed from any executive direction and responsibility,” and the president was “depriv[ed] . . . 
of [the] essential power needed to discharge his major executive responsibility.”535  Therefore, 
“the vesting of such authority in an officer independent of direct responsibility to the President 
for his acts, is clearly in violation of the constitutional principle of the division of authority 
between the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government.”536  Only by if the executive 
functions exercised by the Comptroller General were returned to the Treasury Department could 
the federal government come back into line with the unitary structure erected by the Framers. 
Fourth and finally for our purposes, to accomplish all of these goals and to guard against 
the emergence of similar problems in the future, the Report also suggested that the president 
have continuing responsibility for reorganization.537 
                                                 
534 “The settlement of accounts and the supervision of administrative accounting systems are 
executive functions; under the Constitution they belong to the Executive Branch of the Government.”  Id. at 21. 
535 Id. at 20-21.  The Brownlow Committee also maintained that the Comptroller General’s preaudit 
power violated the Take Care Clause as well: 
 
The removal from the Executive of the final authority to determine the uses of appropriations, 
conditions of employment, the letting of contracts, and the control over administrative decisions, 
as well as the prescribing of accounting procedures and the vesting of such authority in an officer 
independent of direct responsibility to the President for his acts . . . is contrary to article II, section 
3, of the Constitution, which provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.” 
 
Id. at 22. 
536 Id. at 21 (citing Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1928)).  It also avoided the 
practical problem of permitting a public officer to audit his own accounts, financial acts, and decision, a situation 
inconsistent with sound management and accounting principles.  Id. at 20.  See generally FISHER, supra note 306, at 
121; KARL, supra note 294, at 234-35; Karl, supra note 509, at 184.  The Comptroller General must have sensed the 
threat that the Brownlow Committee posed to his position.  He initially refused to acknowledge its existence and 
delayed disbursing funds for several weeks.  See KARL, supra note 294, at 164-65. 
537 The Report also recommended that the White House staff be enlarged; that the civil service be 
expanded cover more federal employees; that a National Resources Planning Board and Departments of Social 
Welfare and Public Works be created.  BROWNLOW REPORT, supra note 517, at 5-6, 8-9, 19-20, 27, 32-36;  see also 
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Roosevelt warmly endorsed the Report and its historic espousal of the unitariness of the 
executive branch in his message transmitting it to Congress on January 12, 1937, calling it “a 
great document of permanent importance.”538  Referring to himself “as one on whom . . . the 
constitutional responsibility for the whole of the Executive Branch of the Government has 
lain,”539 Roosevelt called on Congress to return to the structure of “the Executive Branch as it is 
established under the Constitution.”540 
In particular, Roosevelt agreed with the Committee’s view that the independent agencies 
had become a “‘fourth branch’ for which there is no sanction in the Constitution”541 and which 
had begun to “defeat the Constitutional intent that there be a single responsible Chief Executive 
to coordinate and manage the departments and activities in accordance with the laws enacted by 
Congress.”542  Therefore, Roosevelt specifically embraced the Report’s recommendation that the 
independent agencies be consolidated into the executive departments.543 
                                                                                                                                                             
KARL, supra note 294, at 228-44; 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 260, at 1521; WATKINS, supra note 513, at 556. 
538 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Recommendation for Legislation to Reorganize the Executive Branch of 
the Government (Jan. 12, 1937) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Reorganization Recommendation], in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF 
FDR, supra note 450, at 668, 670. 
539 Id. at 668.  His reliance on the Article II Vesting Clause became more explicit later in his message: 
 
[T]he Presidency was established as a single, strong Chief Executive office in which was vested 
the entire executive power of the National Government. . . .  What I am placing before you is the 
request not for more power, but for the tools of management and the authority to distribute the 
work so that the President can effectively discharge those powers which the Constitution now 
places upon him.  Unless we are prepared to abandon this important part of the Constitution, we 
must equip the President with authority commensurate with his responsibilities under the 
Constitution. 
 
Id. at 672-73; see also Karl, supra note 509, at 185 (noting that Roosevelt in his December 22, 1936, press 
conference maintained that the President was the only constitutional executive and that independent agencies might 
represent an unconstitutional usurpation of executive authority). 
540 Roosevelt, Reorganization Recommendation, supra note 538, at 669. 
541 Id. at 671; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, Summary of the Report of the Committee on 
Administrative Management Transmitted with the Preceding Message (Jan. 12, 1937), in 5 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, 
supra, at 674, 678-79 [hereinafter Roosevelt, Reorganization Summary] (quoting Report’s conclusion that 
independent commissions threat to become “‘a headless fourth branch of the Government, not contemplated by the 
Constitution, and not responsible administratively either to the President, to the Congress, or to the Courts’”). 
542 Roosevelt, Reorganization Recommendation, supra note 538, at 670. 
543 Id. at 670-72; see also Roosevelt, Reorganization Summary, supra note 541, at 675-76. 
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Roosevelt also adopted the Report’s condemnation of the office of the Comptroller 
General as an “‘unconstitutional assumption of Executive power.’”544  As Roosevelt observed, 
“The Presidency was established as a single, strong Chief Executive in which was vested the 
entire Executive power of the national Government, even as the legislative power was placed in 
the Congress and the judicial in the Supreme Court and inferior courts.”545  Permitting an officer 
who was primarily accountable to Congress to exercise part of that power was inconsistent with 
the Constitution.546 
If Congress were to centralize the executive power in the president, Congress would not 
be giving the president an undue amount of power:  it would do nothing more than “go[] back to 
the Constitution” and return to what the Framers intended.547  As Roosevelt observed 
In spite of timid souls in 1787 who feared effective government the Presidency 
was established as a strong single Chief Executive office. . . .  What I am placing 
before you is the request not for more power, but for the tools of management and 
the authority to distribute the work so that the President can effectively discharge 
those powers which the Constitution now places upon him.548 
Therefore, Roosevelt called upon Congress to give its immediate and expeditious consideration 
to the Brownlow Committee’s Report and even called a special session of Congress during the 
usual recess period between November 1937 and January 1938 so that the reorganization bill and 
other key pieces of legislation could receive more rapid consideration.549 
                                                 
544 Roosevelt, Reorganization Recommendation, supra note 538, at 671 (quoting the BROWNLOW 
REPORT, supra note 517, at _); see also Roosevelt, Reorganization Summary, supra note 541, at 680 (criticizing the 
Comptroller General for “his unconstitutional usurpation of power”). 
545 Roosevelt, Reorganization Recommendation, supra note 538, at 673. 
546 Id. at 671-73. 
547 Id. at 674. 
548 Id. at 673. 
549 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A “Fireside Chat” Discussing Legislation to be Recommended to the 
Extraordinary Session of the Congress (Oct. 12, 1937), in 6 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 450, at 429, 429, 434 
(1941).  See generally DAVIS, supra note 509, at 35; 3 GOLDSMITH, supra note 260, at 1499-1500; Hawley, supra 
note 509, at 77, 87; Karl, supra note 509, at 185; Rohr, supra note 518, at 94-95. 
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At first the reorganization bill faced little opposition.  The House acted first, passing bills 
providing for the additional White House staff and restoring the president’s reorganization 
authority by wide margins.550  As Roosevelt requested, the House bill did not include a legislative 
veto provision, requiring only that the reorganization orders lay before Congress for sixty days.551  
The House bill failed to accommodate the President’s request that all agencies be subject to the 
reorganization authority, exempting the independent agencies as well as four other agencies.552  
McJimsey notes that “conservatives disliked the proposal to do away with the office of 
comptroller general, which in the hands of a Republican appointee, had held up various New 
Deal projects.”553 
The debate began to heat up when the Senate considered all of the Brownlow 
Committee’s recommendations as one bill.554  Coming out of committee, the Senate version, like 
the House version, exempted the independent agencies from the president’s reorganization 
authority and made no provision for a legislative veto.555  Senators from various states banded 
together in an attempt to shield their pet programs from the president’s reorganization power, but 
                                                 
550 For the bill providing for six additional presidential assistants, see 81 CONG. REC. 7701-02 (1937) 
(passing the bill 260 to 88); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1177, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).  For the bill restoring the 
President’s reorganization authority, see 81 CONG. REC. 8875-76 (1937).  Two other related bills, H.R. 8276, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (making the Comptroller General subject to presidential supervision while transferring his 
audit functions to a newly established Auditor General), and H.R. 8277, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (broadening 
the civil service and replacing the Civil Service Commission with a Civil Service Administrator), were reported out 
of Committee, H.R. REP. 1587, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (accompanying H.R. 8277); H.R. REP. 1606, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (accompanying H.R. 8276), but were never debated or brought to a vote on the House floor.  
However, their terms were incorporated when the House debated the Senate’s version of the bill. 
551 See MORGAN, supra note 294, at 189.  A floor amendment to add a legislative veto was defeated 
63 to 104.  81 CONG. REC. 8869 (1937). 
552 H.R. 8202, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).  The House rejected floor amendments to add exemptions 
for three additional agencies.  81 CONG. REC. 8666-67 (1937) (Rural Electrification Administration) (voice vote); id. 
at 8867-68 (Forest Service) (voting 34 to 130); id. at 8868-69 (Civil Service Commission) (voice vote).  See 
generally KARL, supra note 294, at 247; MORGAN, supra note 294. 
553 MCJIMSEY, supra note 425, at 182. 
554 S. 2970, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).  This bill was later superseded by S. 3331, 75th Cong., 3d 
Sess. (1938). 
555 S. REP. NO. 1236, supra note 293, at 8. 
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their efforts were unsuccessful.556  The Senate also rejected a floor amendment to reinstate the 
legislative veto557 before finally passing its version on March 28, 1938, by a vote of forty-nine to 
forty-two.558  However, a procedural blunder prevented the floor manager from substituting the 
House bill so that it could go to conference.559  The reorganization bill would have to pass the 
House a second time before if it were to have any chance of becoming law. 
The closeness of the Senate vote revealed how much the political climate had changed 
since the House vote in 1937.  Moreover, even though the economy had taken a downturn in mid 
1937, the sense of emergency which prevailed in 1933 when Roosevelt was first granted the 
reorganization power was missing.560  The failure of several of the President’s key legislative 
proposals, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, revealed deep divisions in the Democratic 
                                                 
556 The closest call came when the Senate voted 41 to 41 and 38 to 38 to reject Senator Bennett 
Champ Clark’s amendments to exempt the Veterans Administration and then tabled the motion to reconsider by the 
bare margin of 38 to 36.  Id. at 3823-27.  The Senate also voted 33 to 50 to reject Senator Key Pittman’s proposed 
exemption of the Forest Service, id. at 3818, and voted 21 to 42 to reject Senator Clark’s amendment to exempt the 
Bureau of Biological Survey, id. at 3844.  After the failure of these amendments, Senator Clark and his supporters 
recognized there was little chance of attaching any additional exemptions to the bill, and he allowed his amendments 
to exempt the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, National Mediation Board, Railroad 
Retirement Board, Bureau of Animal Industry, National Park Service, United States Tariff Commission, Bureau of 
Reclamation, Bureau of Public Roads, Bureau of Investigation, Soil Conservation Service, Tennessee Valley 
Authority, Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, and Bureau of Agricultural Economics to be rejected by voice votes with 
virtually no debate.  Id. at 3844-46. 
557 Id. at 3645 (voting 39 to 43). 
558 Id. at 4204.  The closeness of the vote was surprising.  Despite frenzied efforts by the 
Administration to ensure its passage, a number of President Roosevelt’s staunchest supporters voting against the bill.  
See also JAMES M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT:  THE LION AND THE FOX 344 (1956); DAVIS, supra note 509, at 213-14; 
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 509, at 279; MORGAN, supra note 294, at 192. 
559 The unanimous consent decree which closed debate provided that no further amendments would 
be allowed after 3 o’clock on March 28, 1938, and that after voting on the pending amendments, “the Senate shall 
proceed to vote upon the bill (S. 3331) without further debate.”  83 CONG. REC. 4204 (1938).  As Professor Karl 
noted, “Someone pulled [Senator Byrnes’s] coattail to ask a question in the midst of debate and by the time his 
attention could be returned to the discussion, it was too late.”  See KARL, supra note 294, at 249.  Although Senator 
Byrnes tried to call up the House bill in order to substitute the language of the Senate bill immediately after the vote, 
he knew he lacked the votes needed to close debate.  With his political capital already drained, Senator Byrnes 
withdrew his motion after receiving assurances that the Senate bill would receive expedited consideration in the 
House.  83 CONG. REC. 4205-07 (1938). 
560 BURNS, supra note 559, at 344; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 36; KARL, supra note 433, at 157-58; 
MORGAN, supra note 294, at 185; Hawley, supra note 509, at 88; Karl, supra note 294, at 4. 
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party.561  But most importantly, the fight over the court packing bill wasted valuable political 
resources and badly damaged the FDR’s prestige.562  In short, Roosevelt had lost control of 
Congress.563  Public interest in the reorganization bill was also running sky high, fanned by the 
efforts of Father Charles Coughlin and Frank Gannett’s Committee to Uphold Constitutional 
Government.564  The rise of dictatorships in Europe had made the public wary about granting 
broad powers to the president.565  McJimsey notes that “as with the Supreme Court reorganization 
plan, executive reorganization seemed to threaten the institutional balance within the 
government.  This was just the kind of issue that could break down barriers between ‘liberals’ 
and ‘conservatives.’”566  Finally, the reorganization bill’s opponents were also aided by large 
numbers of agency bureaucrats who feared that reorganization might cost them their power bases 
or even their jobs.567  
To make matters worse, the two gambits Roosevelt used to try to turn the tide backfired 
badly.  First, Roosevelt offered that the reorganization bill’s close victory in the Senate “proves 
that the Senate cannot be purchased by organized telegrams based on direct 
                                                 
561 KARL, supra note 433, at 132-33; BURNS, supra note 559, at 344; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 102-
04.  Professor Davis also cited the failure of the farm bill and the proposal for seven regional planning authorities.  
Id. at 102-03. 
562 Many commentators have argued that it was merely bad fortune that the reorganization plan came 
up for a vote so soon after the failure of the court packing plan and that under different circumstances the plan would 
have passed easily.  DAVIS, supra note 509, at 100; KARL, supra note 294, at 248;-49; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 
509, at 277;  MORGAN, supra note 294, at 184-85; Rohr, supra note 518, at 95.  Other commentators have suggested 
that it was no accident that executive reorganization and the court packing plan arose at the same time, arguing that 
both were, along with the National Resources Planning Board proposal and Roosevelt’s unsuccessful attempt to 
influence congressional primaries, parts of a larger plan to concentrate power in the President.  Hawley, supra note 
509, at 87-88; Karl, supra note 509, at 186, 192.  This Article need not resolve the question, because scholars on 
both sides of the question agree that the court packing fight all but doomed the reorganization proposal. 
563 BURNS, supra note 559, at 346; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 104. 
564 DAVIS, supra note 509, at 213; KARL, supra note 433, at 146; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 509, at 
279; MORGAN, supra note 294, at 192. 
565 BURNS, supra note 559, at 344; KARL, supra note 433, at 158; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 509, at 
278; MORGAN, supra note 294, at 184-85, 192; Karl, supra note 294, at 4.  Even if the concern about dictatorship 
was groundless and based on irrational fear, the public’s belief in it undeniably undercut the reorganization bill.  
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 509, at 278-79. 
566 MCJIMSEY, supra note 425, at 183. 
567 DAVIS, supra note 509, at 24; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 509, at 278. 
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misrepresentations.”568  The comment impugned the integrity and sincerity of both the Senators 
who voted against reorganization bill and the citizens who had made their sentiments known to 
their representatives.569 
Second, the President called a press conference at two o’clock in the morning to release a 
copy of a letter to an anonymous friend disavowing any intention of becoming a dictator.  The 
letter emphasized: 
 A:  I have no inclination to be a dictator. 
 B:  I have none of the qualifications which would make me a successful 
dictator 
 C:  I have too much historical background and too much knowledge of 
existing dictatorships to make me desire any form of dictatorship for a democracy 
like the United States of America.570 
Roosevelt also took the opportunity to criticize the legislative veto.  Although he 
acknowledged that he would go accede to Congress’s wishes “in the overwhelming majority of 
cases,” he still felt that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.571  Reorganization orders had the 
force of law and as such must be repealed by conventional legislation, passed by both houses of 
Congress and signed by the president.  Concurrent resolutions, which do not require the 
president’s signature, were “only an expression of Congressional sentiment.  Such a resolution 
cannot repeal executive action taken in pursuance of a law.”572  Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s 
reassurances did little to quiet the fears of the people and Congress.573 
                                                 
568 See 83 CONG. REC. 4505 (1938) (statement of Rep. Hoffman); see also MORGAN, supra note 294, 
at 192. 
569 TED MORGAN, FDR 493 (1985). 
570 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Refutes Dictatorship Charges Connected with the Pending 
Reorganization Bill (Mar. 29, 1938) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Dictator Letter], in 7 PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 
450, at 179, 179; see also BURNS, supra note 559, at 345-46; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 220-21 
571 Roosevelt, Dictator Letter, supra note 570, at 181. 
572 Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 260, at 137; MORGAN, supra note 
294, at 192. 
573 DAVIS, supra note 509, at 221; BURNS, supra note 559, at 346. 
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These factors made the second House debate on the Senate bill one of the hottest debates 
in years.574  Representative John O’Connor, Chairman of the House Rules Committee and a 
staunch opponent of the bill, blocked all attempts to pass a rule to govern the debate,575 and the 
House leadership’s attempt to close debate on the bill failed.576  Roosevelt began scrambling to 
avoid defeat, dropping his opposition to the legislative veto and offering exemptions to the pet 
agencies of key constituencies.577  Despite the Roosevelt Administration’s best efforts, however, 
the House voted 204 to 196 to recommit the bill to committee, effectively killing it until the 
following year.578  Bowing to the inevitable, Roosevelt sent a message to the House leaders 
thanking them for “the fine fight.”579 
The following year, after the furor had died down, Roosevelt submitted a watered-down 
version of the reorganization bill.  The Reorganization Act of 1939 provided for the additional 
White House staff recommended by the Brownlow Committee, but conceded the most 
contentious issues of the year before, exempting a laundry list of agencies from reorganization,580 
dropping the provision abolishing the Comptroller General, and reinstating the two-house 
legislative veto.581  Even with these changes, the administration needed to put forth extraordinary 
efforts to get it passed.582  
                                                 
574 MORGAN, supra note 569, at 493. 
575 BURNS, supra note 559, at 345; DAVIS, supra note 509, at 214. 
576 83 CONG. REC. 4616 (1938) (voting 149 to 191). 
577 BURNS, supra note 559, at 345; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 260, at 137; 
FISHER, supra note 306, at 93; MORGAN, supra note 294, at 192-93. 
578 83 CONG. REC. 5123-24 (1938); see also FISHER, supra note 306, at 131-32; LEUCHTENBURG, 
supra note 509, at 279; MORGAN, supra note 294, at 192. 
579 Franklin D. Roosevelt, A Message on the Defeat of the Reorganization Bill (Apr. 9, 1938), in 7 
PUB. PAPERS OF FDR, supra note 450, at 206. 
580 Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, § 3(b), 53 Stat. 561, 561.  Although exempt from 
reorganization, the independent agencies were brought within the President’s budgetary control.  § 201, 53 Stat. at 
565. 
581 § 5, 53 Stat. at 561-62.  See generally DAVIS, supra note 509, at 419-20; FISHER, supra note 306, 
at 132, 164; KARL, supra note 294, at 257; Karl, supra note 294, at 4. 
582 The Senate added a crippling amendment by a vote of 46 to 43 before Presidential promises to 
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Roosevelt completed the administrative reform process in September 1939 by issuing an 
executive order forming the Executive Office of the President, which was divided into six 
departments, including the Bureau of the Budget brought over from the Treasury Department.583  
The creation of the Executive Office of the President was an important legacy of the Roosevelt 
Administration and one which would greatly enhance presidential control over the by-now 
sprawling executive branch. 
The fact that the Brownlow Committee’s proposal ended in compromise does nothing to 
change the implications of this debate for the existence of a constitutional custom regarding the 
unitary executive.  Even though the Roosevelt eventually yielded on each of the major issues, he 
did begin by vigorously asserting the president’s right to control all executive functions of the 
federal government and saw his views accepted to some extent by both the House and the 
Senate.  Under the principles of coordinate construction, the mere fact that Roosevelt in the end 
bowed to political realities does not dissipate the force of his initial opposition.  Particularly 
when viewed along with Roosevelt’s other efforts to defend the unitariness of the executive 
branch, Roosevelt’s abandonment the Brownlow Committee’s initial recommendations does not 
represent the type of acquiescence needed to give rise to an established practice permitting 
congressional-imposed restrictions on the president’s power to execute the laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Our systematic examination of the practices with respect to the unitary executive during 
the third half-century of our Republic thus leads to a conclusion that is quite at odds with the 
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conventional wisdom.  Far from supporting an established practice demonstrating that arguments 
in favor of the unitary executive are foreclosed as matter of history, as some scholars have 
suggested,584 the record shows that presidents throughout this period consistently asserted and 
defended the president’s sole authority to execute the law.  To the extent that the historical 
evidence supports the existence of an established practice in either direction, it would tend to 
favor those supporting, rather than those opposing, the unitariness of the executive branch. 
The briefest review of the major events between 1889 and 1945 bearing on the unitary 
executive confirms this conclusion.  As noted earlier, one of the signature developments of this 
period is the increasing reliance on the so-called independent agencies, such as the ICC, FTC, 
and the Federal Reserve Board.  Robert Cushman’s classic study of the independent regulatory 
commissions demonstrated how each of the presidents during this period exerted their authority 
over those agencies to ensure that they executed the law in accordance with administration 
policy.585  Our own review of the historical record confirms Cushman’s conclusion.  Backed by 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in McAllister, Parsons, Shurtleff, and especially Myers, every 
president during this era treated these agencies in the same manner as purely executive agencies, 
directing their operations and removing commissioners who disagreed with the president’s vision 
for the enforcement of the law.  It was not until the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in 
Humphrey’s Executor was their even a colorable claim that these commissions were in any way 
independent of the president.  And even after Humphrey’s Executor, FDR continued to assert his 
authority over the independent agencies and to remove members as he saw fit.  Roosevelt further 
attempted to resolve the issue by pushing through the recommendations of the Brownlow 
committee that the independent agencies should be integrated into the executive departments, 
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only to see that effort derailed by the change in political winds caused by the failure of FDR’s 
court-packing plan. 
Another development of this period that is often cited as precluding arguments in favor of 
the unitary executive is the advent of the civil service system.  As we have shown, the history of 
civil service reform during this period is completely consistent with the unitary executive.  Until 
1897, the civil service laws did not even purport to place any substantive restrictions on the 
president’s removal power, aside from prohibiting removals for refusing to contribute to political 
campaigns.  Although subsequent executive orders and statutes provide that members of the 
classified service could only be removed for “cause,” this requirement was consistently 
construed by the presidents, the Civil Service Commission, and the courts as simply reflecting 
the statutory requirement mentioned above and not as creating any substantive limits on the 
removal power.  Although such limits would eventually arise, they would not appear until after 
this period had run its course. 
In addition, it was during the years between 1889 and 1945 that Congress attempted to 
expand the use of the legislative veto as a means for controlling the execution of the law.  As the 
Court explicitly recognized in INS v. Chadha,586 presidents during this period opposed the 
legislative veto with enough consistency to foreclose any suggestion that they acquiesced to this 
particular derogation of the unitary executive.  The institution of the special prosecutor made an 
occasional appearance.  In each instance, however, the special prosecutors were subject to 
presidential direction and removal. 
Throughout this period, presidents also asserted their authority in other myriad ways to 
ensure that federal officials executed the law in accordance with their wishes.  They freely 
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exercised the removal power and opposed efforts to lodge executive functions in officials 
answerable only to Congress.  They widely supported executive reorganization and created the 
Bureau of the Budget and the Executive Office of the President to centralize control of federal 
spending.  There can be little doubt that all of the presidents from Benjamin Harrison to Franklin 
Roosevelt were committed defenders of the theory of the unitary executive.  Thus, contrary to 
what some have asserted, the historical record does not serve as a trump that obviates 
consideration of the broader range of constitutional arguments regarding the president’s authority 
to execute the law. 
Perhaps most importantly, the period between 1889 and 1945 saw a tremendous growth 
in presidential power, as strong presidents like the two Roosevelts and Wilson (and to a lesser 
extent Cleveland and McKinley) helped remake the institution of the presidency into the primary 
institution for mobilizing and implementing political will.  Their administrations set the stage for 
the imperial presidency that would dominate modern times. 
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